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ABSTRACT
BRIGER, LILLY Engaging China in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of U.S.China Relations and Recommendations for the Future
In this thesis, I explore the fragile political relationship between China and the
United States. In the past decade, an intensifying level of competition between the two
powers is advancing the perception amongst a growing number of Americans that China
will one day emerge as a future adversary that will draw the U.S into a strategic rivalry
and possible security conflict. The purpose of my thesis is to determine the type of
“threat” China presents to the United States, and based on this assessment determine
which policies would best increase the possibility for collaboration while limiting the
potential for future rivalry between the two powers.

I used theories of structural realism to explain the developing power
dynamic between China and the United States. I argue against the claims
stipulated by proponents of this theory who maintain that a security conflict or
strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. is inevitable. Moreover, I also refute
the claim that China seeks to grow powerful enough to overturn the existing order.
Instead, I take the position that based on China’s international behavior it can be
deemed a “rational power” that acts in accordance with its own self-interests. It
would be contrary to China’s interests to precipitate a security conflict with the
United States over Taiwan because, in the same way the U.S. is economically
dependent on China, China is heavily reliant on access to U.S. markets to sustain
its current growth levels. From my research, I concluded as China emerges as a
global power, the challenges it presents to the U.S. are tempered with greater
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opportunities for collaboration, reaching beyond commercial interests extending to
diplomatic and security matters.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: China versus U.S.A?
At the turn of the nineteenth century, virtually no one could have predicted the
accuracy of Napoleon’s foresight when he observed, “Let China sleep, for when she
wakes, she will shake the world.” 1 Yet, in the present state of affairs, it is impossible to
ignore the reality of this statement. China’s titanic rise has dominated these early years of
the twenty-first century. Fueled by the world’s fastest growing economy, with an average
annual growth rate of 9.5% for the past three decades, China is rapidly emerging as a
major economic power in the ever changing structure of the global community. It has
become an attractive business environment for U.S. and multinational corporations. As a
result, foreigners invested more money in developing businesses in China in 2003 than in
any other part of the world. 2 Accordingly, “China continues to grow at unparalleled rates
because the world continues to feed it.” 3

1

Kynge, James. China Shakes the World: A Titan’s Rise and Troubled Future—and the
Challenge for America. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006. Pp. xiv
2
Fishman, Ted C. China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America
and the World. New York: Scribner, 2006. P. 15
3
Ibid
1

China’s newfound economic prowess, which manifested itself in the form of
approximately $1 trillion of foreign exchange reserves at the end of 2006, has also aided
its transformation into a major geopolitical power. China’s vast wealth, coupled with its
insatiable appetite for finite sources of energy and other resources has established a new
assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy that in many ways challenges the preeminence of
the U.S. in international relations. Moreover, in the last few years, the intensifying level
of economic competition between these two giants has exacerbated the ideological and
cultural differences that have existed between the two since Nixon’s opening of China in
1972.
During a period in which: U.S. unemployment has been on the rise; wages have
stagnated; and the strong possibility of recession looms over the U.S. economy, the
average American is slowly remembering that China is an authoritarian state, ruled by a
Communist Party that rejects the liberal democratic ideals of governance embraced by the
U.S. When these factors are combined with the media’s incessant portrayal of China “as
an ominous threat before which the west must change or wilt” they contribute to an
exaggerated and miscalculated fear of the “rising Chinese tiger” and the threat it presents
to the United States. 4 This thesis takes the position that such flawed misperceptions, in
both public opinion and policy circles, endanger the development of sound policies that
can effectively deal with the challenges to the United States presented by China’s rise.
In the coming years, no relationship will be more important than that between
China and the United States. In The Economist’s special edition The World in 2008, the
editor Daniel Franklin comments in his opening letter that “America and China will be
4

Hutton, Will. Hutton,Will. The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace
China as a Partner or Face It as an Enemy. New York: Free Press, 2006. P. 6

2

[the] prime players in the matters that will concentrate minds around the world in 2008”. 5
One area that will surely draw attention is the economic relationship between these two
powerhouses and its impact on the world economy. A second area is the more subtle
diplomatic and security relationship between the two, which, after the fall of the Soviet
Union, often operates in the shadows of the first. In this thesis, the principal focus is upon
the latter area. However, I maintain that the economic issues and diplomatic and security
issues that exist between China and the United States are not mutually exclusive and,
therefore, cannot be strictly separated into economic and political disputes.
In chapter three, I illustrate this point in greater detail when examining the effects
of China’s economic rise on its political relationship with the U.S. I evaluate the increase
of China’s geopolitical influence relative to the declining one of the U.S. This threatens
to upset the delicate balance between competition and collaboration, which serves as the
foundation of this relationship. On the other hand, however, it can be effectively argued
that the U.S. is facing many similar challenges from other countries, namely India and a
resurgent Russia, given their competing interests regarding both commerce and security
matters.

In accordance with the existing literature on the topic, this thesis considers
the rise of China, in many ways, to be synonymous with the overall trend of
globalization. Therefore, the challenges China now presents to the United States
are consistent with those of this powerful, and seemingly unstoppable, force. In
the last several decades, the so-called “great powers” of the twentieth century, that

5

Franklin, Daniel. "From the Editor, The World in 2008." The Economist: The
World in 2008 Special ed. 2007: 13.
3

is the U.S, Japan and Europe, have, to a large extent, lost their productive edge, a
central quality to any state seeking to preserve a position of preeminence in
geopolitics, to the so-called BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 6 The irony
in this transitional trend cannot be ignored. It was the very system of global
liberalism, set in place by the U.S. in accord with other Western powers that has
facilitated the economic booms experienced by these newly emerging market
economies. In the aftermath of WWII, the U.S. sought to create a world capitalist
system that would favor and protect the dominant position of the U.S. in
international relations. Yet, in hindsight it is evident that such a system is, in fact,
favorable to those nations entering it later because of their ability to build on the
advances of their predecessors. In this sense, it can be said that global liberalism is
much like the Greek heroes of antiquity in that both are endowed with a tragic
flaw that is ultimately responsible for their own demise.
This concept is supported by the stipulations of Immanuel Wallerstein’s
theory of The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist WorldEconomy. He argues that global liberalism perpetuates the downfall of the very
powers that set it in place. 7 This results from the fact that it becomes more difficult
to impede the spread of technological expertise as the system grows to include
new economies. As a result, it is inevitable that, over time, the nations that enter
6

Pesek, William. “Viewpoint: Building bricks – Lessons for India and Brazil”.
International Herald Tribune; Sec: Marketplace by Bloomberg. December 10, 2006.
7
Wallerstein, Immanuel. “The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the
Capitalist World Economy”. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 24 (1983)
p. 101
4

the system later achieve greater results because they come in at a time when the
markets are most profitable and the technology at their disposal is more advanced.
The consequence, Wallerstein then goes on to say, is that these newly integrated
economies begin to "eat away" at the material base of the existing powers’
productive capacity and thus gain a greater competitive advantage. Ultimately, the
BRIC economies have replicated and innovated the existing economic models.
Their developing economies allow them to exploit cheap labor to increase their
productive capacity, while the price of labor steadily increases in the developed
nations and production rates fall. Additionally, the developing economies are
exonerated from meeting the standards placed upon more advanced nations
because of their “developing status”, contributing to their leveraged position.
Cheap labor and a high level of productivity give these emerging market countries
a significant competitive advantage that threatens the economic superiority of the
existing powers.

ARGUMENT

Although the United States faces challenges from all these developing
economies, in this thesis I argue that none of these challenges are more daunting
then those presented by China. For example, India and Brazil are, to a significant
extent, in a strategic alliance with Washington and their economic success has
been accompanied by democratic transitions that are favorable to a U.S. led world
order. Yet, China’s remarkable transformation into a capitalist economy, which in

5

many ways, outcompetes that of the U.S., was facilitated under an authoritarian
state ruled by a single Communist party. 8 Even more troubling is that the level of
economic growth China has experienced which, under other circumstances, should
have been the breeding ground for democratic transitions. Instead this has served
only to further ingrain and legitimize the system of autocratic Communist rule.
Furthermore, as China increasingly moves its industrial sector into areas of high
technology, no longer restricting itself to the production of low cost goods, the
intensity of its competition with the United States increases. As a result, by the
sheer virtue of its size and its advanced technological capabilities, China is now
perceived as a “peer competitor” or “near peer competitor” within a growing
number of U.S. government circles. Accordingly, this perception advances the
image of China as a potential strategic rival to the United States.
In this thesis, I maintain that such premature judgments of China’s
capabilities threaten the future stability of U.S.-Chinese relations. Although
American politicians are aware of the need to collaborate constructively with
China, in a democracy such as our own, it often tends to be the case that emotion
rules over objectivity. When this reality is taken against a growing desire amongst
American politicians since 9/11 to appear “tough” to its constituents on issues of

8

Azar, Gat. “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers”. Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug 2007;
Vol. 86, Is. 4 (2007).
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national security, it increases the risk of the kind of misperceptions, in our
relationship with China that could lead to military confrontation.9
The chapters ahead explore the fragile political relationship in the past four
decades between China and the United States, beginning with its inception in 1972 and
then carrying on to the present day. For almost four decades, in spite of the tremendous
ideological and cultural differences that exist between the two, the U.S. and China have
been able to avoid painting one another as adversaries. In part, this results from the fact
that China has been a substantially weaker than the U.S. and has not been in a position to
challenge the unilateralist policies of the U.S., both in this bilateral relationship and in the
rest of the world. Thus, for the past three and a half decades, the balance of power in this
relationship has been significantly tilted in Washington’s favor.
The State Department website boasts that the practice of engagement has
characterized U.S.-China policy for the past thirty-five years. The rationale for engaging
China derives from the broad conclusions that motivated Nixon to reach out to the PRC
in 1972 in hopes of balancing the power of the Soviet Union. 10 From this view,
engagement has been justified on the grounds that it is more beneficial to the
advancement of U.S. national interests and, to a lesser degree, global stability, than
perpetually isolating China. In practice, engagement seeks to sustain and increase
relations with China by enhancing dialogue and integrating the country into the
institutions and organizations of the international system. To a large extent, engagement
9

Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
P. 10
10

Hills, Carla A. et al., “U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible
Course” Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report
No. 59 (New York, New York; The Council on Foreign Relations, 2007) Stable URL:
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has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy both economically and diplomatically. Currently,
China is a member of an array of international security organizations. 11 The purpose of
engagement is to increase collaboration, while keeping disputes in areas of diverging
opinions and competing interests at a minimum. However, the rise of China challenges
the U.S. modus operandi of engagement in many ways.
These challenges arise from certain assumptions that have dictated the pattern of
engagement since1972. The idea of engaging China, which effectively reversed the prior
two decades of U.S. foreign policy, was partially grounded in Nixon’s early logic that it
was best to improve relations with China while it was still a substantially weaker power
so that its interests could be shaped in ways conducive to those of the United States. At
the time, this meant using China to balance the power of the Soviet Union. This concept
was the foundation for the U.S. engagement policy with China. This thesis maintains that
the U.S. practice of engagement operates on two critical assumptions, namely, that China
is a) the weaker power; and b) its interests can be shaped in ways desired by the U.S.
Therefore, “engagement” tends to provide the appearance of a mutually beneficial
relationship, while it, nevertheless, greatly distorts the balance of power in the favor of
the U.S. In the past, when the United States was the dominant world power, this was a
sound policy model. In recent years, however, the rise of China as not only a strong
economic power, but also a viable military power in Asia,undermines both of these
assumptions. Accordingly, as China’s capabilities are enhanced as a result of its
economic success, these outdated perceptions of China’s power challenge the U.S.’s
conventional approach to this bilateral relationship.

11

A list of these organizations is reflected in Appendix I
8

In response to China’s increased capabilities, U.S. policymakers have reverted to
repeating what Harry Harding calls a cycle of euphoria and disillusionment in this
complicated relationship. 12 The consequence is an overwhelming tendency in U.S. policy
circles grossly to exaggerate and overestimate the capabilities and objectives of those
perceived to be “peer” or “near peer” competitors. Harding asserts that the U.S. is often
culpable of perceiving China in terms that are far too simplistic and emotional, painting
an image of it as either an ally or adversary. 13
This compulsion to define our relations with China in such rigid terms contributes
to an inconsistency in the U.S.’s application of engagement. This thesis grounds the
growing fear in this country that soon China will be powerful enough to change the rules
of the current international system better to serve its own interests against the theoretical
claims of structural realism for the purpose of my analysis. Recently, the argument that
engagement does not sufficiently protect the U.S.’s position in this event has been
gaining growing popularity in the United States. However, the high level of
interdependency between our two economies eliminates the possibility of completely
abandoning this approach in pursuit of a more confrontational policy of containment. The
highly emotional debate surrounding the “China threat” obstructs the formulation of
articulate policies that would seek to navigate a middle ground.
Despite these concerns, in many ways, however, U.S.-Chinese relations are better
than they were during the tumultuous period 1990’s, following the events in Tiananmen
Square and the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there are early warning signs,

12

Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972.
Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1992. 361
13
Ibid 360-1
9

which are discussed in chapter three, endorsing the perception that a future strategic
rivalry may well develop between China and the U.S. To deter this possibility, the Bush
Administration has called on China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in
international affairs and promised to cooperate towards achieving this end, noting that
inevitably countries would “hedge” against the risk that China will emerge as a future
belligerent. 14
The argument in this thesis is that, if China is to become a more “responsible
partner” in international affairs, U.S. engagement needs to be become more balanced, or
at least uphold an appearance of equality and partnership in areas of collaboration.
Continuing to address these concerns unilaterally and outside the peripheries of
established multilateral institutions will harm the stability of this relationship, while
doing little to protect the U.S. against a possibly adversarial China. The current unilateral
and, at times confrontational, method of “hedging” the risk that China may emerge as a
future adversary is self-defeating. It advances the type of misperceptions that increase the
risk of war amongst states. This was most recently reflected in the Bush Administration’s
attempt to secure a military agreement with India. Such styles of “hedging”, namely
bilateral military alliances falling outside the scope of both the established international
institutions and international law, only provokes greater hostility on the part of China’s
leadership and its highly nationalistic citizens. 15 The Chinese are well aware of the ongoing and, at times, hostile debate within the U.S. about how to accommodate China’s

14

Bader, Jeffrey A. et al. 2007. “Contending with the Rise of China: Build on Three Decades of Progress”.
Opportunity 08: A Project o the Brookings Institution (pp.1-15). Washington, D.C: The Brookings
Institution. Stable URL: P. 5
15

This is a reference to the U.S.’s attempt to deepen its bilateral military alliance with
India by overriding the established international rules set forth on nuclear proliferation.
10

rise. All of these anxieties are intensified by China’s deep-seated nationalism and historic
suspicion of foreigners, especially of Western powers. 16
Ultimately, if the goal is to ensure China’s lasting commitment to the current
international system, the U.S. must seek to engage China in a manner that strengthens the
institutions of the current international order. Engaging China in the twenty-first century
requires that U.S. policy makers take into account the recent decline of the U.S.’s global
authority and economic superiority and the limitations this reality poses on policies that
seek unilaterally to influence China’s behavior. Thus, the U.S. must seek to settle our
disputes with China and voice our opposition to its policies or behavior within the
established multilateral institution of which we are both members when it is possible.
When these issues fall outside the scope of such institutions, it is necessary that
we voice our concerns or demands in coalition with our allies, such as the E.U. to
strengthen both the legitimacy of our claims and increase the chances that they will be
met. This will avoid creating an adversarial dynamic that pins the U.S. directly against
China. The United States and China must actively work to avoid this scenario not only
for the sake of their own relations, but also to maintain the stability of global system. As
a result of the size and interdependencies of the U.S. and Chinese economies with each
16

Hutton 60: This type of xenophobia in China dates back to what is known as the
“Century of Humiliation”. The beginning of this period can trace its origins to 1842,
when the treaty of Nanjing was signed. It stipulated that the Chinese would cede Hong
Kong to Britain. Following this concession, no fewer than twenty-six treaties were
drafted, delivering a row of crushing territorial defeats to the Chinese at the hands of
foreign powers. The entire Chinese coast was opened up to foreigners on terms that
grossly disadvantaged China, while enhancing the prosperity and wealth of European and
Japanese powers. Since the onset of the Communist Revolution in 1949, China’s
communist party has disseminated propaganda promising a reversal of this humiliation
and a restoration of China’s greatness amongst the international powers. It continues to
promote a type of nationalism that is highly suspicious of foreign powers, especially
those of the West and Japan by invoking this historical fear (Hutton, Will).
11

other and the global community, any diplomatic strains that disrupt the flow of trade and
commercial exchanges between them could undermine and even create havoc with the
global economy as a whole.
It would, however, be entirely too idealistic and naïve to assume that this course
of action will always be possible. Inevitably, there will be instances that the U.S. will
have to act unilaterally to protect its own interests when there is a clear and present
danger to its national security, as any state would in such a precarious situation. On the
other hand, using the latter as a general framework to guide our exchanges with China
will limit the possibility that such moments will escalate tensions to levels that would
destabilize the course of our bilateral relations. Contrary to the Bush Administration’s
beliefs, an emphasis on multilateralism is not an admission of weakness or defeat. Rather,
the two pronged policy of: 1) recognizing the limitations of our power; and 2)
formulating policies accordingly will shield this nation from the type of zealous
overextensions of authority that have precipitated the decline of great empires and
hegemonies throughout history.
CHAPTER OVERVIEW:
Chapter 2
Chapter two is dedicated to a historical analysis of Nixon and Kissinger’s opening
of China. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the origins of engagement policy and, by
doing so, to isolate its central components. I will outline the primary motivations that led
Nixon to approach China, as well as the necessary steps taken by both Nixon and
Kissinger to ensure the success of this rapprochement. In 1972, the opening of China was
ultimately successful on the part of the U.S. first because of Nixon’s tremendous

12

foresight that no world system could effectively operate with China isolated on its
outskirts. Second, Henry Kissinger correctly assumed that security, not ideology, was the
most important of China’s national interests. By reconfiguring the Chinese threat,
Kissinger and Nixon were able to open a dialogue that had been closed for far too long
because of a miscalculated perception of China’s objectives and capabilities. The
culmination of these efforts, resulting in Nixon’s trip to China, was reflected in the
Shanghai Communiqué. The primary function of this document was to outline areas of
common interests, while recognizing the existence of strong divergent opinions,
especially over the issue of Taiwan. Chapter two also provides a brief summary of the
normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations, with a particular emphasis on the issue of
Taiwan. It will set up the dissenting opinions that continue to surround the present debate
over Taiwan’s future political status. In this chapter, important connections between the
past and present are made, thus providing lessons for future diplomatic exchanges
between China and the U.S.

Chapter 3
Chapter 3 demonstrates how the recent rise of China complicates the foundation,
set forth by Nixon and Kissinger, for U.S. engagement policy. In 2008, China and the
U.S. continue to share many of the same differences that they did in 1972, with new
discrepancies over such issues as human rights, trade, and currency valuation added to
the list. An increased level of competition between the China and the U.S. has also
contributed to upsetting the delicate balance in this political relationship. Several factors
have been responsible for exaggerating the competitive elements of this power dynamic.

13

The first two are linked to China’s growing necessity for, consumption of, energy and
other natural resources. China is now the world’s second largest consumer of petroleum,
behind the United States. Its consumption of petroleum is continuing to grow at an
alarming rate. With supply lines limited, the Chinese government is forced to seek new
sources that directly challenge the United States in two ways. First, it has gained market
share of sources of supply that are considered strategic U.S. suppliers of petroleum, such
as Venezuela. This type of action only contributes to the image of China as an ominous
competitor that threatens U.S. integral sources of energy supply and, in turn, upsets the
U.S. economy. Second, China’s need for oil has motivated it to seek close ties with
countries that are generally considered hostile enemies of the U.S. For example, China’s
relationship with Iran and the Sudanese government complicates the possibility of
diplomatic collaboration on issue of nuclear proliferation in Iran and peace keeping
coalitions and human rights in Darfur.
Essentially, this chapter outlines the reasons contributing to the realistic
perception that China may one day emerge as a future rival of the U.S. that inevitably
may result in a security conflict. This Chapter will outline the growing area of tensions
between the two powers over issues of competition for natural resources, trade, finance,
human rights, nuclear proliferation, non-military intervention, as well as Taiwan and
China’s military modernization.
Chapter 4
Chapter four provides an overview and critical analysis of existing
recommendations for the future of U.S./Chinese relations. It first compares and contrasts
the rise of China presented in chapter three against the current realities of China’s

14

domestic and international experience, which, pose certain limitations on its behavior.
This chapter exploresthe reasons for which, I maintain, support the conclusion that a
security conflict between China and the United States is unlikely in the foreseeable
future. Instead, the chapter sets out the position for the necessity of policies that would
limit the possibility of a Cold War type strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China. Set
against this backdrop, the chapter concludes with an array of recommendations to
improve relations in the areas of outstanding disputes presented in chapter three.
Chapter 5
I conclude with a brief analysis concerning the broader implication for the U.S.’s
shifting position in the global community outlined in its bilateral relations with China.
Namely, I identify a change in the landscape of global politics that renders the current
U.S. approach to foreign policy somewhat outdated and ineffective to deal with the
challenges of the twenty-first century.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
In the arena of international relations, it is not solely the emergence of a new
power that contributes to the mitigating structure of the system, but more importantly it is
the reactions of the existing powers to this development that redefines the system.
Therefore, the way in which the United States responds to the challenges presented by
China’s rise will be just as significant, perhaps even more so, than the rise of China itself,
in setting the course for this young century. For these reasons, it is critical that the U.S.
moves actively to construct a diplomatic approach that engages China on a more equal
level within the established institutions of the international system. These newfound
responsibilities inevitability are likely to lead to greater accountability on the part of the

15

Chinese for their behavior in international relations. China’s participation in the global
financial system will not yield these results on its own.
Moreover, while, in the present state of affairs, China has strong incentives to
cooperate and remain a relatively benign power because of the tremendous benefits it
gains from the global economy, this may not always be the case. The recent volatility in
the international markets proves that stability of this system is not guaranteed. An Asian
financial crisis at the scale of the ongoing one in the U.S. could have disastrous results for
U.S.-Chinese relations. It would be wise, therefore, for the U.S. to strengthen the existing
system while it still can do so to ensure that China will have no other option but
responsibly to engage and participate in accordance with the current standards. 17 These
ideas will be further explored in the chapters that follow.

CHAPTER 2:
17

Ikenberry, G. John. "The Rise of China and the Future of the West; Can the
Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2008 87. 1 (2008), p. 23 (1-5
online).
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Historical Analysis of the U.S.
Rapprochement with China 19691972: Setting the Tone for a future
Policy of “Engagement”
We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is
that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither
of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge
it so we may be able to talk across it. 18
Richard Nixon 1972

It is a rare occasion in history when an event is able to convey the magnitude of
its significance at the time it unfolds. On February 21, 1972, when President Richard M.
Nixon set foot on Chinese soil, the world stood by and consciously watched history in the
making. Nixon’s trip symbolized a dramatic reversal in U.S. foreign policy. It ended
nearly twenty years of estrangement between the two nations, which began in 1949, when
the Communists seized power in Beijing and the U.S. chose to recognize Chiang Kaishek’s ROC government in Taiwan as the sole legitimate rulers of China. This chapter
examines the historical foundations of U.S. engagement policy through an analysis of
Nixon and Kissinger’s opening of China.
When Nixon, joined by Kissinger as his national security advisor, took office,
both men believed U.S. foreign policy had fallen in a state of crisis. The Vietnam War
was squandering the country’s geopolitical resources. During a decade in which tensions
18

Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap,
1978. p. 565
17

between the Soviet Union and the U.S. had reached its zenith, the Soviet Union had
achieved nuclear parity with the United States. Nixon and Kissinger believed an
emboldened USSR, combined with the spread of Communism in many parts of Asia,
presented a significant threat to U.S. global interests and security.
As strong adherents to the philosophy of realpolitik, they saw that nothing less
than the power of the United States was at stake in this crisis. 19 According to this school
of thought, power is the most vital aspect of national interests in international relations.
From this theoretical viewpoint the security of a nation is dependent upon the
preservation of its power, and thus policies must be drafted to promote and protect this
vital resource. In previous administrations during the Cold War, the U.S. maintained its
power balance with the Soviet Union by allocating tremendous funds to the advancement
of military technology, especially nuclear weapons. Yet, a decline in America’s global
economic position eliminated the possibility of regaining strategic superiority through the
proliferation of more weapons. The costs of funding the Vietnam War had led the U.S. to
run its first bilateral trade deficit with Japan in the postwar period. 20 Militarily containing
the Soviet Union was draining the U.S. economy. Consequently, Nixon and Kissinger
were motivated to explore new alliances that might bolster their diplomatic leverage over
Moscow.

19

Brown, Seyom. The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy
During the Kissinger Years. New York: Columbia University Press 1979. P. 2

20

Schaller, Michael. “Détente and the Strategic Triangle, or ‘Drinking Your Mao Tai and
Having your Vodka too’.” In Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 19541973. Edited by Roberts S. Ross and Jiang Changbin. Cambridge, Mass., 2001. P. 362
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In the opening months of his presidency, Nixon decided that rapprochement with
China would best advance the strategic national interests of the United States. He
believed a relationship with China would give the U.S. a strategic advantage over the
USSR, and to a lesser degree it could be useful in terminating America’s involvement in
Vietnam. But in 1969, few could have predicted the fortitude with which Richard Nixon
would pursue an opening to China, given his reputation as a ferocious anti-communist.
However, above any ideological convictions, Nixon was a realist. He understood that the
integration of China into the global community was inevitable. But more importantly, it
was imperative for the stability of the international structure. In February of 1970, Nixon
publicly presented his intentions to improve ties with China in his first foreign policy
report to Congress.
The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the
global community. United States Policy is not likely soon to have much impact on
China’s behavior, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is certainly in our interest,
and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what
steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking…We will seek to
promote understandings which can establish a new pattern of mutually beneficial
actions. 21

His arguments here were reminiscent of similar ideas he had outlined in an article
entitled, “Asia after Vietnam”, which appeared in the 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs. He
understood that the realities of the international structure would eventually force the U.S.
to engage with China. He concluded it was better to dictate the terms of engagement
while China was the relatively weaker power and the United States could use an alliance
with it to further U.S. strategic interests. Ultimately, Nixon, who was later joined by
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Kissinger on this view, believed that improved ties with China would accelerate the pace
of strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. 22
Thus on the part of the United States, the motivations for engaging with China
were twofold. First, it provided a significant strategic advantage for the U.S. over the
Soviet Union in the power politics that dominated the Cold War. This was the primary
concern driving the strategy. A second reason was the idea that the United States could
benefit from the exchange of culture, ideas, and markets with China. Similar
considerations led the Chinese to reach the same conclusion.
In China, fears of the Japanese, but primarily Soviet military expansionism
prompted the Mao and Zhou to take the bait offered by the U.S. Furthermore, the Cultural
Revolution had ravished the economic infrastructure of the country. Although Mao and
Zhou were not entirely prepared to abandon the principles of the Revolution, they
understood that the only way for China to become a geopolitical force, a so called “great
power”, was through a process of economic and technological modernization. 23 For this
to take place, it was necessary for China to abandon its isolationist policy and seek
venues that would allow for its integration into the global community. Developing a
relationship with the United States presented itself as the most viable catalyst for securing
these ends. America was the gateway to the West, and ultimately modernity. This
process, however, would not be completed until Deng Xiaoping’s regime was in power
during the 1980’s after he moved to fully normalize diplomatic relations with the U.S.
during the Carter Administration in 1979.At the time Nixon moved to reconcile relations,
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the benefits of establishing cultural and economic ties with China were also becoming
increasingly clear in the United States. Regaining access to the Chinese market was
advantageous to American business. In 1946, at its height, the Chinese market accounted
for 5 percent of total American exports. 24
These two common interests, first, a short term goal of deterring the threat of
Soviet expansion, and the second, a long term goal of bringing the United States and
China closer together culturally and economically, provided the foundation for
engagement and collaboration. 25 Nevertheless, at the time of Nixon’s visit, China and the
United States remained deeply divided by ideology and culture. Bridging this gap
presented a significant challenge. The divergent opinions concerning the Taiwan issue
threatened to override any possibility for cooperation in the stated areas. Consequently, in
order to ensure the success of rapprochement and the future normalization of relations,
Nixon and Kissinger had to persuade Mao and Zhou of the necessity for collaboration in
spite of disagreements, such as Taiwan, that could not be immediately resolved.
Nixon and Kissinger accomplished this end by exaggerating the importance of the
common interests upon which the two countries could develop a relationship. Ultimately,
the success of Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomacy was grounded a realistic reassessment of
Chinese objectives and capabilities. Under Nixon’s guidance, Kissinger began to
extensively research China. Motivated by the theoretical implications of structural
realism, Kissinger concluded that it was the security threat presented by the Soviets, and
not a solution to the political future of Taiwan, that was China’s primary concern.
Pursuant to this analysis, Kissinger believed that for the Chinese, finding a strategy to
24
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contain Soviet expansionism would override any ideological concerns, such as the
political future of Taiwan. After his secret trip, it was clear that a heightened security
threat to the Chinese would dilute any possibility of the Taiwan issue blocking a
breakthrough in relations. The Taiwan issue, however, would require significant
concessions on the part of the U.S. before a breakthrough in relations could occur. This
point will be addressed in a latter section. The key facet of the American diplomacy,
which secured the opening of China, was a balance of exaggerating a Soviet military
threat, while quickly pacifying any anxieties on the part of the Chinese that emanated
from their historic suspicions of Western betrayal with reassurances of U.S. friendship.
Although the second interest of bringing China and the U.S. closer together
remained important to developing relations, the primary motivation for engagement, on
both ends, was a common opposition to the USSR. In the short run, exaggerating the
Soviet threat was beneficial because it broke the pattern of estrangement. Nonetheless, in
the long run this strategy was problematic. In the realm of geopolitics, a relationship
based on the common resentment of an adversary is very weak. In his doctoral
dissertation, Kissinger emphasizes this notion: “For opposition can create a wide
consensus, perhaps even the widest attainable one, but its components, united by what
they do not like, may be greatly at odds about what should replace it.” 26 The demise of
the Soviet Union, significantly strained this fragile relationship, and will be discussed in
Chapter four.
However, given the magnitude of the divide in ideological values, the strategic
threat of the Soviet Union was the only thing strong enough to initially bridge the gap
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between China and the U.S. Since this first common interest only provided the possibility
for a fleeting alliance, Nixon and Kissinger solidified the foundations of the relationship
by simultaneously advancing the second common interest. The exchange of cultures and
markets during the process rapprochement legitimized the incentives for engaging. Even
though this second common interest was less prominent than the first, it provided a
framework for the future normalization of US/Chinese relations. The cultural and
economic relationship that developed following these initial effort, helped ease the strain
put on the relationship when the external threat of the Soviet Union evaporated. More
importantly, it was Nixon’s pursuit of this second interest during rapprochement that
facilitated China’s integration into the community of nations. Furthermore, the process of
opening China set the tone for the development of future relations: a policy of
engagement based on the interplay of collaboration and competition.
SEC. 1: A HISTORY OF HOSTILITIES
Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts to open China were plagued by twenty years of
estrangement, motivated by hostilities originating in the early phases of the Cold War. In
1949, when the Sino-American conflict began, much of the world was divided into two
ideological camps: communists and capitalists.Thus, when the Communist revolution
descended upon Beijing, establishing the People’s Republic of China, Washington’s
deepest fear was realized: the creation of a monolithic communist bloc whose sphere of
influence would now extend throughout Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. In many
prominent circles within the United States, it was seen as nothing less than a Communist
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conspiracy for world domination. 27 This idea was further ingrained in the minds of
American policy makers with the onset of the Korean War in 1950. In a letter to the
British foreign minister, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote, “there can be little
doubt but that Communism, with China as one spear-head, has now embarked upon an
assault against Asia with immediate objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma…”. 28 It was
the official perception in the U.S. that the “Red Tide” was moving to engulf all of Asia.
As a result, Washington adjusted its policies accordingly with respect to Beijing.
Containment and isolation were the tenant features of U.S. China policy for the
next twenty years. Washington implemented a series of abrasive military and diplomatic
tactics, or the purposes of advancing this strategy. These actions, in turn, elicited a
reciprocal hostile response in Beijing. Beginning with the Truman Administration and
ending with Nixon’s, direct American diplomatic relations were severed with Beijing.
Furthermore, a pervasive U.S. effort to block China’s admission to the United Nations
emerged, as well as a strict ban on trade with the mainland. China responded to these
moves by sending economic and military aid to anti-Western and left-wing movements
throughout Asia, where Vietnam was only one of many recipients.
The most critical manifestation of Washington’s new position concerning China
was its shift in policy towards Taiwan, which became the central issue dividing the
nations. In June 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan,
thereby reaffirming America’s commitment to the security of the island. This action was
followed by the resumption of military assistance to Taipei and a subsequent mutual
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defense treaty with the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek. 29 Moreover, the
United States supported the position that the legal status of Taiwan was undecided, but it
would no longer be recognized as a part of the mainland. Essentially, this had the effect
of supporting Chiang Kai-Shek’s position, which claimed that the ROC was the sole
legitimate ruler of China. Undoubtedly, this implied that the Communist government in
Beijing was illegitimate and should therefore the PRC should not be recognized as a
major world power. The PRC vehemently refuted this policy, citing that Taiwan was
indeed a part of the mainland. In addition, Mao’s government claimed the mutual defense
treaty, as well as the U.S. military mission on the island were a violation of China’s
national sovereignty, and as a result should be readily dealt with through force. The
“Taiwan Issue” became the biggest obstacle for Nixon and Kissinger in their pursuit of
rapprochement. It was the hostilities surrounding Taiwan that almost brought China and
United States to military confrontation during Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. In the current
state of affairs, although the dimensions behind the disagreement have changed to some
extent, the Taiwan issue remains a substantive problem in U.S.-China relations. The
nature of it will be further examined both chapter three and four.
At the height of the Cold War, investment, cultural relations, and intellectual
exchanges were entirely absent. The true character of estrangement is best illustrated in
the following description:
There were no formal diplomatic ties, no trade, no legal travel back and forth,
and virtually no mutual contact between ordinary citizens of the two
countries…Probably never in the modern period have two major societies been
so isolated from each other for so long in peacetime…China and the United
States confronted each other, at a distance, as implacable adversaries. 30
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With the absence of even limited cultural, diplomatic, and economic exchanges, the U.S.
and China had no insight into each other’s political climate. Consequently, a tendency to
exaggerate Chinese capabilities and miscalculate their objectives became standard
practice in Washington. When events in the international system began to favor the
prospect of reconciliation, above all else, it was a misinformed perception of China that
prevented the possibility of rapprochement in earlier Administrations.
During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, futile attempts were made to
reach out to Beijing. These minimal conciliatory gestures, however, were ill received by
the Chinese. At the time, the PRC was invigorated with zealous fervor emanating from
the Cultural Revolution. 31 The destructive effects of the program were not yet apparent.
Mao believed any concessions made to the U.S. would be interpreted as a sign of
weakness and serve to undermine his absolute authority. In 1968, motivated by the
revolutionary tide, China suspended bilateral ambassadorial contacts in Warsaw, which
remained the sole official diplomatic contacts between the two nations. 32 The war in
Vietnam heightened feelings of animosity on the part of the U.S. towards the Chinese,
who were financing the North Vietnamese war effort.
In the years that followed, a huge information gap was developed. As a result of
being isolated from one another, an environment developed to foster fears and anxieties
in both countries. A lack of communication combined with these sentiments gave way to
false preconceptions of each other’s objectives. This led to the creation and
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implementation of faulty policy. It was portrayed as a petulant adversary, whose values
were incompatible with those of liberal democracy, and therefore not worthy of
negotiations until Beijing modified its behavior. Although, American opinion concerning
China was divided, it was this one which reflected the majority consensus and strongly
supported by a powerful China Lobby.
SEC. 2: RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA
When Nixon took office, certain events came to his assistance, that brightened the
possibility of a reconciliation between China and the U.S. Beginning in 1956, with
Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s brutalities, an ideological rift ensued between the
two communists giants. 33 However, it was not until the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968, followed by Brezhnev’s statement citing Moscow’s indefinite
right to intervene in the domestic affairs of any communist country, that China began to
alter its perception of the USSR from ally to adversary. 34 The fear Soviet expansionism
in Asia was exacerbated in the minds Mao and Zhou during a Sino-Soviet border clash in
1969. Chinese anxieties continued to mount in the face of the Soviet’s deployment of a
large number of troops along the Ussuri River. Nevertheless, while circumstances may
have helped, it is doubtful “whether rapprochement could have occurred with the same
decisiveness in any other Presidency”. 35 More precisely, it was Nixon’s tremendous
foresight and intuition setting the policy direction coupled with Kissinger’s shrewd
diplomatic skill in its implementation that gave life to the policy of rapprochement. China
had figured extensively into Nixon’s early political career. It was his vision that dictated
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the nature of the policy and guaranteed it would be carried out. A closer analysis
regarding some of his statements concerning U.S. China policy will better illustrate this
point and provide a foundation for understanding “engagement” policy that was pursued.
In 1954, in a NSC meeting leading up to the Geneva Conference, Nixon privately argued
it would best serve national interests of the United States to consider the possibility of
trading with Communist China. 36 He cited that trade could be used as a bargaining chip
in negotiations to pursue more direct contact with the PRC without having to recognize
the government. What is important to highlight in this early policy recommendation, is
the larger strategic backdrop against upon which Nixon rested his argument. The trade
proposal reflected Nixon’s deeper conviction that “China was too important” to the
United States to be ignored or isolated. It was the key to Asia…and Washington simply
had to engage with the issue of China in its Asian strategy.” 37
An article Nixon wrote for Foreign Affairs in 1967, entitled “Asia After
Vietnam”, is often cited in the relevant literature as the clearest articulation of Nixon’s
later China strategy. In his memoirs, Nixon himself wrote that the arguments presented
were the most public revelation of his strong belief in the importance of establishing
relations between the United States and China. Nixon wrote:
Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside
the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten
its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially
most able people to live in angry isolation…For the short run, then, this means a
policy of firm restrain, of no reward, of a creative counter pressure designed to
persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules
of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back in the
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world community—but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of
world revolution. 38

Nixon, again, addressed these points in his inaugural address. His argument carried
tremendous foresight into the events of international relations. He understood that the
realities of the international structure would eventually force the U.S. to engage with
China. He concluded it was better to pacify the existing hostilities while China was in a
weaker position.
Once in office however, above all else, Nixon’s China policy was primarily
motivated by his desire to ease growing tensions with the Soviet Union. Nixon believed
he could accomplish this by pursuing a relationship with China and adding a triangular
dynamic to the bi-polar conflict. The leverage gained by playing the “China Card” would
in his mind accelerate the pace of strategic arms negotiations between the two
superpowers. Kissinger was intrigued by Nixon’s early ideas on China, but not entirely
convinced. He believed the prospect for rapprochement would only be possible in the
face of a real and present danger to China on the part of the Soviet Union. With the
growing military tensions at the Soviet-Chinese boarder, Kissinger got the assurance he
needed.
Nixon and Kissinger postulated that China’s mounting security concerns resulting
from the growing external military threats presented by the Soviet Union would be
motivated to improve relations with the United States. Consequently, it was this variable
that would determine the success of Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy. Guided by the
theoretical stipulations of structural realism, Nixon and Kissinger wagered that Mao and
Zhou’s concerns to ensure the security of China would “override their disdain for
38
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capitalism, unity with Hanoi, and even their desire for the unification of Taiwan to the
mainland, issues that had isolated the nations from each other for almost twenty years”. 39
To advance their strategy, Nixon and Kissinger would have to open the lines of
communication so as to inform the Chinese of their intentions.
In the fall of 1969, Nixon and Kissinger began taking steps that would allow them
to communicate more directly with the Chinese. After Nixon had set the policy direction,
Kissinger took the appropriate measures to advance it. He instructed Walter Stoessel, the
American ambassador in Warsaw, to contact the Chinese ambassador, Lei Yang. Stoessel
was told to request the resumption of ambassadorial talks for the purpose of discussing
prospects for future high-level negotiations. Beijing was readily informed of this
invitation and shortly thereafter instructed Yang to set up a meeting. On January 20,
1970, Stoessel and Yang met and marked “a new beginning” in U.S.-China relations. 40 In
this first informal gathering, Stoessel made it clear to Yang that Nixon was prepared to
send a high-ranking official from his administration or receive one from China to discuss
issues of national interest to both nations. On February 20th, speaking on the behalf of
Mao, Yang told Stoessel “the Chinese would be pleased to receive a high-level envoy to
explore further solutions to the fundamental questions of Sino-American relations.” 41
This meeting, which seems insignificant when set against the magnitude of the
endeavor it sought to accomplish, was a major benchmark in the rapprochement process.
For the first time, Beijing was made acutely aware of the seriousness behind the Nixon
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Administration’s intentions of opening a political dialogue between the two countries.
From this point forward, both sides understood there was a common desire for improving
relations. The Warsaw contact clarified any mixed signals Beijing was receiving from
Washington. It was the first in a series of moves to correct the misperceptions that
prolonged the estrangement. Moreover, the Stoessel/Yang encounter was the departure
point for subsequent high-level diplomatic negotiations. As a result, Nixon and Kissinger
began to prepare for such a summit. However, their efforts were hindered by what
Kissinger called “bureaucratic foot dragging” of the worse kind. 42
The State Department remained distrustful of Beijing’s intentions. Representative
of the bureaucracy’s cautionary nature, it took the position that such an exchange
necessitated a clear change in China’s confrontational policies with the U.S. In addition,
State worried that a meeting of this caliber would compromise America’s alliance with
Japan and Taiwan. These objections from the State Department coupled with the
American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, which China vociferously condemned, had the
affect of prolonging any diplomatic encounter between American and Chinese officials.
Nevertheless, this temporary strain in U.S.-China relations, which had delayed the
possibility of a meeting, was eased in a matter of months. It was due, in part, to the
withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia in July, which was further supplemented
by conciliatory concessions on the part of the U.S. allowing for the exchange of material
goods between some of America’s European Allies and the Chinese.43
The protests stemming from the State Department did not prove to be as palatable,
as those of the Chinese. The bureaucratic constraints, which continued delaying any
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further actions to implement their strategy, greatly exacerbated Nixon and Kissinger’s
disdain and mistrust of bureaucracy. Their solution to the problem at hand was simple:
the exclusion of the State Department from any knowledge or decision-making
concerning the China initiative. In 1970, two secret channels, were established with the
Chinesein which the White House would directly manage the contacts. The second of
these channels, which went through Pakistan, yielded the greatest success and ultimately
gave way to Kissinger’s secret trip. 44
On December 8, 1970, Kissinger received a message from the Chinese via the
Pakistani channel. It was a message written by Zhou under Mao’s instructions to Nixon,
inviting a representative of the president to come to China. It outlined that the primary
purpose for the meeting was to discuss the American presence in Taiwan. Zhou conveyed
the tremendous significance of this message by highlighting how it was the first time in
their numerous contacts that a proposal for such an exchange was issued from one head
of state to another. 45 Thrilled at the prospect of finally meeting the Chinese, Nixon and
Kissinger, understood that limiting the agenda to Taiwan would undermine their strategic
objectives. Solely discussing Taiwan may have led to a stalemate early on in the process
of rapprochement. It was believed that this scenario could be avoided by exaggerating the
threat of Soviet expansionism, which they believed was Beijing’s overarching national
interest. In Kissinger’s response he emphasized this point, citing that the meeting “would
not only be limited to Taiwan but would encompass other steps designed to improve
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relations and reduce tensions”. 46 With the exception of minor exchanges, this
correspondence was followed by months of silence.
During the ensuing interim period, Kissinger took various measures to educate
himself on China. 47 His task was to find a means of improving relations without
compromising the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. At this point it was clear that Taiwan
would be a perpetual irritant in their course of their negotiations and would continue to
block gradual improvement in U.S.-China relations. Therefore, in devising the American
approach, Kissinger understood it was necessary to reduce the centrality of Taiwan.
Studying an array of issues confronting Chinese policymakers allowed Kissinger to gain
a better understanding of Beijing’s national priorities, and where Taiwan realistically fell
on this spectrum. Diplomatic success is entirely dependent on the negotiators ability to
precisely calculate the other side’s objectives. As a dedicated student of diplomacy,
Kissinger understood this better than anyone. He concluded that above all else, China
sought a relationship with the U.S. to counterweight the threat of Soviet expansionism. 48
The issue of Taiwan could be marginalized if the Soviet threat appeared eminent.
Nevertheless, Nixon and Kissinger realized that a “gift” was necessary to appease the
Chinese grievances over the issue. This would take the form of the PRC’s acceptance into
the U.N. and the removal of Taiwan, an event that will be discussed in a later section.
On April 6, 1971 the months of silence were broken when the Chinese
spontaneously invited an American table tennis team to visit China after its participation
in the World Table Tennis Championship in Japan. Mao, himself, extended the invitation.
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The whole visit was designed to inform the White House that Beijing had noticed its
initiatives and eager to proceed. 49 This exchange helped in some part to ease existing
tensions. It was a public message to the world that the relationship between China and the
U.S. was changing. It marked yet another breakthrough in relations. On April 27,
Kissinger received another message inviting him to Beijing, but this time Zhou had
dropped the demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan as a precondition and
agreed to the stipulations that Taiwan would be among one of many issues discussed. 50
Shortly thereafter, Nixon agreed to send Kissinger as his emissary in the first set
of negotiations to outline an agenda for his summit with Mao. The details of Kissinger’s
visit were meticulously planned to preserve the secrecy of the endeavor. During his
scheduled tour of Asia, while visiting Pakistan, Kissinger boarded a commercial
Pakistani airliner in disguise and secretly slipped away to Beijing. The Administration’s
public alibi was that Kissinger had fallen ill with a severe stomach virus and had to
withdraw to the seclusion of a private facility for proper medical treatment.
Once in Beijing, Kissinger met with Zhou over a three-day period. The purpose
of the exchange was meant to outline the foreign policy objectives of both nations, while
drawing particular emphasis to areas of cooperation that could serve as the basis for
improving ties, in preparation for Nixon’s visit.51 Through this experience, Kissinger was
able to gain an understanding of the issues motivating Chinese behavior and prepare the
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Administration’s diplomatic agenda accordingly. In the negotiations that followed, it was
clear that each side had an issue of primary importance. For China, it was Taiwan, and
for the United States it was extrication from Vietnam. 52
Zhou reiterated the longstanding Chinese position on Taiwan. Although they
would not use force to integrate the island into the mainland, the PRC opposed special
status for Taiwan and demanded to replace it in the U.N. in order to recognize the
communist government as the legitimate authority of China. 53 Furthermore he insisted
upon the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the island. On the issue of Vietnam, Zhou
articulated the traditional revolutionary standpoint, denouncing the conflict as an
illegitimate and imperialistic endeavor. The American war effort was a violated the
national sovereignty of the North Vietnamese and went against the principles of the
Revolution.
On the issue of Taiwan Kissinger made several concessions. First, he cited the
reduction of American troops would be linked to the improvement of relations with the
PRC and the termination of the Vietnam conflict. Second, he assured Zhou that
Washington would object to any attack by Taiwan against China. Thirdly, he informed
Zhou that in his second term, Nixon would formally recognize the PRC. Lastly, Kissinger
told Zhou that Washington was prepared to support the reinstatement of China to the
United Nations, so long as it did not replace Taiwan. 54 Although Zhou, and above all
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Mao, was not completely satisfied with these concessions, they were sufficient enough to
allow for further improvement in relations.
The most significant issue raised in this first encounter, however, was China’s
concern of Soviet expansionism in and Asia. Zhou expressed his desire that the United
States would be willing to cooperate with China in order to maintain the balance of
power in the region. 55 All this, confirmed Kissinger’s suspicions. He quickly moved to
implement his strategy. Kissinger informed Zhou, that for the reasons he raised, it was
vital to maintain an American military presence in the region. In order to convince Zhou
of the rationality behind this logic, Kissinger proceeded to provide him with American
intelligence data regarding the Soviet military deployment along the Chinese border.56
The purpose of this gesture was two fold. First, it served to exaggerate and confirm
China’s greatest security threat. Secondly, it was meant to reassure Zhou and Mao of the
U.S. commitment to collaborate on the issue by sharing classified information. Kissinger
eased any further anxieties but assuring Zhou that the U.S. would not collaborate with
Moscow in any endeavors that were aimed against the Chinese. Zhou and Kissinger
would meet again in October to outline the terms of the joint communiqué.
In hindsight, it is impossible to ignore the magnitude of the challenge laying
before these men in this first exchange. Kissinger and Zhou represented societies that on
the surface appeared ideologically and culturally incompatible. In addition, the issue of
Taiwan, with no immediate resolution in sight, seemed to reduce the importance of any
other potential areas of collaboration. Nevertheless, Kissinger and Zhou were able to
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overcome these impediments by engaging in a constructive dialogue based on
exchanging their perceptions of global and Asian affairs. 57 It provided a clear
understanding of each other’s purpose and worldview. Furthermore, it established a level
of confidence between the two men that is necessary for the success of any diplomatic
negotiations. By exchanging their ideas, Kissinger and Zhou realized that pragmatic
security concerns overrode ideology on both sides. Zhou explained to Kissinger that a
tradition of common interests existed between their two societies. However, much as
Kissinger predicted, the one that was strong enough to override existing tensions was
their mutual resentment and fear of the Soviet Union. A common security threat had the
effect allowing for a breakthrough in relations without the immediate resolutions to issues
such as Taiwan.
Mao was pleased with the outcome of the meeting. He approved the language of a
decree, drafted by Zhou and Kissinger, inviting Nixon to visit China. The announcement
was carefully prepared so to present the visit as the product of equal efforts on the parts
of both nations. This way Nixon would not be seen as paying tribute to the Chinese, and
Mao’s invitation would not be interpreted as a sign of weakness. It established an image
of equality and mutual respect.
Back in the United States, Nixon was attempting to secure domestic support for
his policy initiative. He conferred with high level Republican Senators and convinced
them of the importance surrounding the initiative. His efforts were successful. Once
Kissinger returned with a positive report, they began to draft what would become the
Shanghai Communiqué, issued at the end of Nixon’s trip. After the completion of this
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first draft, Nixon ordered Kissinger to return to China in October in order to prepare the
agenda for his visit and draft the language of the communiqué with Zhou. 58
The first draft Kissinger presented to Zhou followed what Nixon described as
“standard diplomatic formula using vague and conciliatory language to patch over the
most heated and insoluble problems”. 59 Here, Nixon is primarily referring to the issue of
Taiwan. Zhou rejected the draft at once on the grounds of its superficiality. True
progress, he cited, would only come from a realistic assessment of the “fundamental
differences” between the two nations. 60 However, the version Zhou proposed contained
such radical and inflammatory language that an agreement on Nixon’s part would
compromise core American values.
In order to reach a compromise, Kissinger agreed that the communiqué follow the
format suggested by Zhou: an outline of the differences between China and the U.S on
various geopolitical issues. To improve the prospect of normalizing relations in the future
however, Kissinger successfully argued that the document should include areas of
agreement as well. 61 His insistence on this point fit into the larger strategy for pursuing
the opening. While differences existed, it was important to highlight any the areas of
cooperation for the development of further positive relations. It provided a counterweight
to the differences that threatened this possibility. Furthermore, highlighting areas of
cooperation in this official document sent a message to the world that Nixon’s trip had
succeeded in advancing the position of Sino-American relations. The areas of agreement
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were i) the opposition of Soviet expansionism in Asia, and ii) expanding the SinoAmerican cultural and economic relationship. 62 The document stated on both parts the
hope for securing the normalization of relations and establishing formal and lasting
diplomatic ties.
The question of Taiwan, however, was more difficult to resolve and further
delayed Nixon’s trip. Significant concessions were necessary for any progress to take
place. On the part of the United States, it abandoned its former position opposing the
Chinese one stating that there was only one China and Taiwan was part of China.
Nevertheless, while the U.S. would not challenge this did not mean that is would
necessarily accept it. Furthermore, the U.S. pledged to ultimately withdraw all American
troops from the island, but would do so only in the wake of a peaceful settlement over the
issue. 63 During his visit to China, Nixon was able to secure support for the document and
the future of relations by privately promising to accept any peaceful solution to the
Taiwan issue, refusing to support independence movements on the island, and advancing
the normalization of relations. China’s admission to the U.N. in October of 1970 and the
removal of Taiwan, which Nixon carefully ensured would not be blocked by the
American delegation, helped to accelerate the pace of his visit. 64 While these concessions
allowed for the possibility of Nixon’s visit, they were not bold enough to substantially
alter the differences divided the two nations over the issue of Taiwan. For this reason, the
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normalization of relations would be delayed another six years. Essentially the Shanghai
Communiqué was designed to ensure and uphold the image of progress in Sino-American
relations, while not compromising either side’s position on the problem of Taiwan. 65
Thus, because of the centrality of the stated common interests to the to each nation’s
national interests collaboration was possible in spite of an immediate resolution to
Taiwan.
After months of planning, Nixon arrived in China on February 21, 1972. He
sufficiently educated himself on Mao and China, so that he might bond with the dictator
and eliminate the possibility of offending him out of ignorance. Throughout the entire
visit, Nixon exaggerated the threat of Soviet expansionism, embellishing the facts when
necessary. In on of his first meetings with Mao he asked him, “why did the Soviets have
more forces on the border facing you than facing Western Europe?” 66 For the Chinese,
this had the effect of reducing the outstanding issues of Taiwan and Indochina. In his
meetings with Zhou, Nixon continued to stress the importance of balancing the Soviet
threat in Asia. He reiterated Kissinger’ promises of not making any agreements with the
Soviets aimed against China. Secretly, he pledged to pursue the normalization of relations
and hoped he could achieve this in his second term.
Nixon’s trip and the Shanghai Communiqué allowed China and the U.S. to
expand their diplomatic contacts, establishing normal diplomatic exchanges Paris and the
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United Nations. This provided both countries with greater information and knowledge of
one another of which was used to accurately guide the formation of their policies. Set
against the enormity of the endeavor they set out to accomplish, the shortcomings of
Nixon and Kissinger’s opening of China are outweighed by its successes. It bridged the
gap left by twenty years of estrangement and gave way to what is perhaps the most
important relationship defining the structure of the international political and economic
system. In his last night in China, while giving a toast at the final banquet, Nixon
downplayed the shortcomings of the rapprochement, and highlighted its successes. He
said that the language of the communiqué was not nearly as significant as the future
developments that were yet to come in the opening of this relationship. The single most
important consideration at that point was “what we will do in the years ahead to build a
bridge across the 16,000 miles and twenty-two years of hostility which have divided us in
the past.” 67 The summit provided the framework for achieving these ends and altering the
structure of the global system to provide greater stability. For this reason, “it was the
week that changed the world.” 68
Sec. 3: Overview of Normalization and Implications for the Future
“[On recognizing China] But if you recognize anyone it does not mean you like them…”
Sir Winston Churchill

In November of 1973, Kissinger informed the Chinese that the Nixon
Administration was “determined to do much more and to complete the process of
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normalization we started two years ago as rapidly as possible” 69 during its second term.
Nixon, however, was never able to deliver this promise during his remaining tenure as
President. Ultimately, there were a number of factors obstructing Nixon’s ability to fully
execute his vision. Outstanding questions surrounding the status of Taiwan continued to
hinder the possibility of a breakthrough in negotiations.The greatest factors obstructing
Nixon and Kissinger’s ability to deliver these results were, however, domestic. In the
wake of America’s extrication from Vietnam, Nixon was falling under increasing
scrutiny from the Congressional investigation for his role in the Watergate Scandal.Thus,
“by 1973, according to Kissinger, Watergate was distracting Nixon and seriously
harming the ability of the United States to conduct foreign relations”. 70 The revelations
of the numerous abuses of power that constituted the Watergate Scandal and Nixon’s
resignation, left Congress and the American public disillusioned and bewildered. The
consequence was a tremendous decline in respect for the office of the presidency and the
legitimacy of its authority. These realities of the domestic climate and his close ties to
Watergate as Nixon’s Vice President, robbed Gerald Ford of any political capital that
might have allowed him to finalize the process of normalization with China during his
presidency. The process was dragged out for five long years until 1979.
China was also experiencing a similar crisis of authority. As Mao lay dying, there
was no clear successor that would assume the leadership of the Communist Party and
somewhat of a power struggle ensued. Kissinger tireless efforts were further hampered
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when his confidant Zhou passed away. In the absence of Zhou’s pragmatism, a senile
Mao was unwilling to relinquish the ideological base of his convictions, namely on the
position of Taiwan, to allow for a breakthrough in relations. Although Taiwan continued
to present itself as an irritant to the progression of U.S.-China relations during the Ford
Administration, the domestic tied in both countries played a greater role in delaying the
process. Once new leaders were instated in both nations the process was able to move
forward.
Normalization: Striking a “Compromise” on Taiwan
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping secured his power hold in China. He was pragmatic in his
deliberations and as a result seized the opportunity for a breakthrough with the United
States at this time. He appealed to the Carter Administration to take a more proactive
attitude on the issue of Taiwan so as to accelerate the pace of negotiations. Consequently,
the central focus of these exchangesbecame U.S.’s relationship with Taiwan after
diplomatic relations resumed.
The Chinese position on this issue can be delineated into three points, and are
largely reminiscent of the earlier concerns presented during the course of Kissinger and
Zhou’s negotiations:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Taiwan is Chinese territory. Therefore, the U.S. military presence
on the island constitutes as a violation of China’s sovereignty
because it is regarded as interference in the country’s internal
affairs.
In order for normalizations to proceed, the U.S. must cease
diplomatic contact with Taipei, withdraw its armed forces for the
island, and abolish the Mutual Defense Treaty. But it can continue
to have unofficial contacts with Taiwan.
Discontinue selling weapons to Taiwan 71
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Under President Carter, the U.S. rejected this third demand, and maintained that it would
continue providing weapons to Taiwan. Additionally, the American delegation demanded
a minimum of one year’s notice to the government of Taiwan before it would forge its
security obligations set forth by the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty.On this issue,
both sides made concessions. The U.S. agreed to terminate the Mutual Defense treaty and
China granted it a year to do it. Ultimately, however, a full agreement was never reached.
The outstanding issue, that remains a source of diplomatic tensions in the present
day, was the question of U.S. arms sells to Taiwan. China continues to object to these
transfers of weapons. Although the United States “conceded” that it would forge its
official diplomatic ties and recognition of the Island, it continues to maintain unofficial
relations set forth by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. This includes “commercial,
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States…and Taiwan”. 72
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the language concerning the U.S.’s commitment to
Taiwan’s defense carries an official tone, despite this appearance of comprise on the issue
of the Mutual Defense Treaty.
At the time, Deng objected to these unbalanced concessions but maintained that it
should not block the process from continuing. His solution was that both sides would
state their own positions on the matter and agree to resolve this matter at a later date. The
Chinese maintained that the “One China” position and that unification was an internal
matter and does not render international interference. Deng and subsequent Chinese
leaders added, however, that China would seek a peaceful course for reunification. U.S.
William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, Gong Li. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia
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policy is vague and ambiguous in regards to the future political status of Taiwan. It has
sought to maintain a neutral position by making a commitment to advance peaceful
resolution to the issue. Under this general claim, the U.S. has pursued a policy of “dual
assurance and dual restraint” since 1979 that encourages China to pursue unification
through peaceful means and discourages Taiwan from pushing for statehood. Yet, section
three of the Taiwan Relations Act obliges the U.S. defend the security of the island
should China seek reunification by coercive measures. This includes preemptive
measures of continual arms sales in order to enhance the sufficient self-defense
capabilities of Taiwan. 73 Such explicit defense and security transactions and
commitments are usually only between states that share official diplomatic contacts.
Deng’s desire to proceed with his domestic and economic performs motivated him to
allow for a breakthrough despite his objections to what he perceived to be elusive and
duplicitous maneuvers on the part of the U.S. Once both sides agreed to disagree on this
matter, China and the United States published the Joint communiqué on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relation between the United States and the People’s
Republic of Chinaon December 15, 1978. It was the formal declaration that the United
States and China had decided to recognize each other and as of January 1, 1979 would
establish official diplomatic contacts.
Deng’s pragmatism was a necessary component to the success of normalization,
but above all else, his greatest skill was patience. Deng understood that in order for China
to one day fulfill its destiny and become a “great power” it would have to bide its time
and make concessions along the way. In his diplomatic negotiations with the United
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States, he played off American impulsivity and necessity for instantaneous results. Deng
made compromises and concessions that forfeited many of China’s ideological
convictions when he proceeded with negotiations despite an agreement over Taiwan.
Deng granted his American counterparts this short-term victory. But China’s recent
economic success and its rise a geopolitical force seem to signal that there was a greater
purpose in mind. One of the tenet features of Deng’s vision for China was the country
should “disguise its ambitions and hide its claws,” allowing it to accumulate its power
without interruptions of threats of containment. 74 As a result, China consented to the
imbalanced terms of U.S. engagement in order to secure access to its markets.
Normalization gave way to the political and economic exchanges as well as the transfer
of ideas, namely technological expertise, that were crucial to China’s development. Deng
predicted it was the only way China would become strong enough to correct this
distortion of power and reverse the perceived century long humiliation it suffered at the
hands of Western Powers.
Presently, China’s recent economic success is allowing it to demand for more
equal terms in its bilateral relations with the U.S and exercise greater resistance to any
terms that may comprise its own interests. In many ways this complicates the pattern of
engagement set forth by Nixon and Kissinger hinging on the assumption that China is a
weaker power and its interests can be shaped accordingly. The chapters ahead explore the
origins of this new assertiveness in China’s international behavior and how it is
manifesting itself in the present state of U.S.-China relations.
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CHAPTER 3:

China’s Rise and the Challenges it
presents to U.S.-China Relations
Now China is very weak. She will grown strong, rich, and independent only after many years; but the
important thing is that we must learn to remember these things…We shall emerge in the world as a
nation with an advanced culture…And one with power. 75
Mao Zedong 1949
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The essential precondition for China’s integration into the global community was
the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979. By opening the
country to foreign investments and new trade opportunities, this newly established
relationship accelerated the pace of China’s transformation into a competitive and
market-based capitalist economy. Arguably, the exposure to and participation in the
international market system, a process that was largely facilitated by the U.S., is the force
responsible for China’s emergence as a major geopolitical power. In recent years,
however, the process of engagement and integration unleashed during the 1972
rapprochement and the process of normalization is producing adverse effects for the U.S.
The original intention was to bridge the political and cultural gap between China and the
U.S by shaping China’s interest in ways compatible with those of the U.S. However,
China’s ability to retain the authoritarian character of its government while implementing
a rigorous program of economic liberalizations challenges the effectiveness of this model.
Now because of its economic power, China can exercise greater resistance in meeting
demands that run contrary to national interests. China’s rise has therefore brought into
shaper focus the divergent opinions it holds with U.S. over an array of political and
security matters that have existed since 1979, while also adding new strains in the
bilateral economic dialogue. This chapter illustrates how these developments contribute
to growing tensions in the United State’s political relationship with China.
For the most part, the perceived competition is largely limited to the areas of: (i)
finance; (ii) demand for finite natural resources; (iii) security matters; and (iv) concern
over China's growing economic power due to continuing large trade surpluses that have
provided China with reserves equivalent to $1.5 trillion. These reserves continue to rise
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on upward growth path. Yet, the symbolic implications of this early competition have
many fearing a return to the power politics of the Cold War. Prestige and influence
ranked among the most important of national interests in this power dynamic. As China
continues to emerge as a dominant economic force on the global stage, its newfound
power is steadily translating into diplomatic leverage that penetrates far beyond its own
boarders. China now has “soft power” in regions, such as Latin America, the Middle
East, and the Asia-Pacific, that have been considered to fall under America’s sphere of
influence. For realists within the U.S., who adhere to the Nixon/Kissinger model of
realpolitik, it appears the U.S. is locked into what seems to be "the power struggle of the
twenty first century" with China. 76 From this standpoint, China is seen as a formidable
rival or a potential “peer competitor.” Consequently, this group believes that preemptive
unilateral measures should be taken to protect U.S. interests, namely its power, by
containing China's growing influence. Throughout the twentieth century this was the
predominant pattern in U.S. foreign policy whenever this country’s regional power
monopoly was threatened. They maintain that this practice will give way to a U.S.
Chinese strategic and security rivalry. This chapter provides an overview of the issues
and disputes contributing to this image of China as a rival, which, in turn, has
compromised the clarity and consistency of U.S. China policy.
China’s economic power is visibly altering the distribution of power in its
relationship with United States, when for at least the last seventy or eighty years the U.S.
has maintained a sizeable advantage over China. This, accordingly, has a direct effect on
the state of their political affairs because of Beijing’s newfound assertiveness in its
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foreign policy. Thus, the chapter also demonstrates how this new development, resulting
from its economic success, is complicating the traditional tactics of U.S. engagement
when faced with new political and security challenges presented by a more powerful
China. The competition that is unfolding between the two states is mitigating each one’s
approach to sensitive diplomatic issues. These issues include, but are not limited to: i)
human rights and civil liberties; ii) how best to approach the problem of nuclear
proliferation in Iran; iii) military or other or non-intervention in the internal affairs of
sovereign states, such as Iraq, Iran, Sudan and now Kosovo; and iv) the future political
status of Taiwan. 77 The most delicate and potentially explosive of these is the issue of
Taiwan. As of the present day, it is the single security matter that holds a realistic
potential for engaging the two countries in a direct military conflict. China and the U.S.,
however, have been able to avoid positioning each other as potential security threats over
this issue since 1979. 78 This change in attitude derives from a combination of things.
Taiwan has been transformed into a pressing matter of national security for many leading
parts of the U.S. government, particularly the Pentagon, because of a belief that China
will become a future adversary. China’s growing economic and military power, coupled
with the potentiality for ongoing strategic competition with the U.S. over finite energy
resources contribute to this perception.
Despite such pressing issues, presently U.S. policy towards Beijing is ambivalent
at best. This uncertainty results primarily from the fact that China’s future course is
shrouded by ambiguity. While the country continues to grow at an astounding rate, it is
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plagued by pervasive social ailments that greatly inhibit its power. The previous chapters
maintained the position that the ultimate goal of the U.S. engagement policy, and the
primary motive for integrating China into the world system, is to help shape its interest in
ways conducive to those of the U.S. Furthermore, in the past, engagement largely was
based on the concept that China was weaker than the U.S. Consequently, Washington
could formulate an agenda that greatly distorted the balance of power in its own favor.
Since reestablishing relations with China, Washington has utilized unilateral policies,
while operating under a bilateral, and at times, a multilateral façade. This practice has
become somewhat emblematic of U.S. foreign policy in the last three decades. Under the
current Bush Administration it has been dropped altogether for a more outwardly hostile
and explicit style of unilateralism.
Beijing has always been aware of this distortion in its relationship with the U.S. In
fact, since the 1970s, China’s leadership has consistently called for a multi-polar world
order, in which China, among other states, would become a viable force buttressing U.S.
influence in the international community. 79 Once again, for those realists who view the
U.S.’s preeminent position in the global community as a central security interest, the
notion of a multi-polar world is rather alarming. Therefore, as China’s economic and
military power continue to grow at a rapid pace, many U.S. policy makers, who are
guided by these concerns argue that an increased level of containment is necessary to
protect the U.S. against the possibility of China as a future aggressor. Populist politicians,
who want to build massive trade and other barriers in a futile attempt to boost domestic
79

Bergsten, et al., China: The Balance Sheet: What the World Needs to Know about the
Emerging Superpower (Washington, DC; Center for Strategic and International Studies
and International Economics, 2006. P. 146-7

51

markets, now join the conservative hawks that maintain this line of rhetoric.
Protectionism and containment are slowly encircling and threatening U.S. trade and
commerce policies. It is submitted that continuing to implement these tactics both
unilaterally and without and attempts to reassurance of good will have disastrous
consequences for the future of this critical relationship.
The following sections will provide an overview of the sources fueling these
growing anxieties within the U.S. government, as well as delineating the opposing
opinions between China and the U.S. on the issues stated above.
SEC. 1: CHINA’S RISE
For the purpose of better understanding the unique challenge China’s rise presents
to the U.S., a review of its capitalist conversion is in order. Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and trade, above all else, have been the principal forces driving China’s booming
private sector, which is a major source of its economic growth. China’s capitalist
transformation and economic success are more the result of its engagement with the
international community than the domestic reforms undertaken to spur agricultural and
industrial production in the 1980’s. Thus, China is a product of the very system it
threatens to unravel.
By presenting China’s rise in this light it illustrates how much the country has
benefited from its relationship with the U.S and the international community. Our
economic dependence runs both ways. Unfortunately, increasing numbers of Americans
are overlooking this critical fact. In part, this results from the mainstream media’s
tendency to act more like alarmists than a source of information. The media often present
the statistical figures of China’s rise in not only an intimidating and exaggerated light, but
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also in a distorted context that addresses only one aspect of the relationship between
China and the U.S. In many ways, because of China’s reliance on the investment of U.S.
corporations, it is just as limited in the level of diplomatic force it can exert over the U.S.
as the U.S. is with China. It is important to keep these considerations in mind when
calculating the challenges and potential threat posed by a rising China to the United
States.
The remarkable success of China’s flourishing economy traces its origins back to
the market reforms implemented by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and 1990s. When Deng
came to power after Mao and the Cultural Revolution, Deng understood that China
desperately needed to modernize its economy if it wished to compete with the newly
rising Asian powers of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and especially its age-old
nemesis, Japan. Deng believed that China had to make a choice between modernizing its
economy and infrastructure or facing the possibility of encirclement. The dilemma struck
a cord with the nation’s historical sense of victimhood. 80 A realist at heart, Deng chose
the latter, even if it meant sacrificing the ideological base of Chinese Communism. His
goal was to improve China’s real income and living standards by adopting an agenda of
economic liberalization. 81 Clearly, Deng had inherited the diplomatic pragmatism of his
predecessor Zhou Enlai. It was readily clear to Deng that inducing modernization solely
through domestic reforms, such as increasing agricultural production and accelerating
industry, would ultimately fail to yield the desired results. The legacy of the Cultural
Revolution, coupled with the years of backwardness resulting from China’s self-imposed
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isolation, had devastated the Chinese economy and crippled industry. Given these
realities, Deng supplemented a program of domestic economic reforms with a program to
increase foreign investment. This program was intended to develop industry and increase
China’s level of participation in international trade. FDI and trade were the catalyst for
capitalism and modernization.
China’s economic development necessitated the adoption and maintenance of
benign conditions within the international system that would ease the country’s transition
from isolation to integration. 82 For this reason, Deng focused his attention on China’s
newly established relationship with the U.S. and finally moved to normalize relations
with the U.S. on January 1, 1979. As noted in chapter two, concessions were made on
both sides regarding the outstanding issue of Taiwan. However, these concessions
greatly favored the conditions set forth by Washington, thus setting the tone for an
imbalanced diplomatic relationship. As a prerequisite for participation in the international
financial community, China also had to agree to U.S. financial laws and trade regulations.
Since Deng was in no position to negotiate, Beijing was forced to accept Washington’s
"top down" demands. These early diplomatic interactions epitomized Washington’s new
approach towards engagement with China.
From the vantage point of the United States, China’s new commitment to market
reform was a symbolic ideological defeat for China and a tremendous victory for
American diplomacy. 83 Nevertheless, it was a short-term concession that would produce
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greater results for China in the long run. As noted in chapter 1, those economies, which
make these types of major market reforms and enter the liberal capitalist system later on,
generally tend to achieve greater benefits. China is the poster child for this theoretical
assessment. The new Chinese capitalist economy, which now accounts for 16% of the
world’s total current exports, can be authentically characterized as “made in China.”
Despite the adoption of this liberal economic system, paradoxically, the political system
still clings to and protects the authoritarian nature of the Chinese state. However, the
great irony lies in the fact that a large part of China’s economic growth, was financed by
America and other Western powers, staunch advocates of the liberal democratic freedoms
associated with their own system, by supplying China with trade partnerships and large
amounts of FDI.
Deng used the neighboring city-state of Singapore as the economic model for
China’s modernization. “In 1992, when Deng was trying to jumpstart reforms, he sent no
fewer than four hundred separate Chinese delegations…to Singapore in a single year to
marvel at what China would become if it modernized.” 84 Singapore was and remains a
thriving capitalist economy, ruled by a one-party system. Even today, Singapore
continues to exude a strong reputation for its lack of freedoms and repressive
government. In short, it was a smaller version of what China was to one day become.
Deng imitated the Singaporean government’s heavily planned and state controlled
policies for economic development, which emphasized the construction of modern
infrastructure to attract foreign investment. 85 Additionally, he implemented the same
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loose restrictions on business that would increase exports and dramatically raise the
standards of living for the Chinese people.
In order to make ends meet, Deng adopted what became known as the “Open
Door Policy”, which was intended to promote a favorable environment that would attract
FDI and increase trade. China’s contemporary, thriving private sector, which currently
attracts over $500 billion in FDI, can trace its foundational origins to this early
program. 86 Under this policy, Deng set up “special economic zones” (SEZ) that fostered
a business environment attractive to foreign investors. SEZ regulations stipulated that the
products of participating enterprises were to be primarily exports; investors were
promised freedom in management of their enterprises; all raw materials and capital goods
could be imported duty-free by participating enterprises; foreign enterprises received a
tax holiday or paid taxes at rates lower than in other part of the country. 87 Moreover, one
of the greatest advantages for foreign companies to move factories to these zones was the
abundance of cheap labor provided by Chinese workers. The significantly lower wage
scale generated greater capital returns as a result of increased productivity, without an
increase in the price of labor. At first these zones were limited to the peripheral costal
areas across from Taiwan and Hong Kong. The purpose of this was twofold. First, it
attracted investment from these wealthier neighbors. Second, it was a means of
duplicating and innovating the effective production models that were flourishing in these
provinces. Essentially, the SEZs were intended to ease the mainland’s transition towards
capitalism by limiting them to the coastal regions.
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Deng described the SEZs “as windows for technology, management, knowledge
and foreign policy to better serve China’s modernization program.” 88 However, the
tremendous success of the initial five SEZ’s caused the number of these zones to grow
exponentially across China. By 1984, these economic zones spread to fourteen cities
along the coastal region. 89 Limiting these zones to specific regions has the effect of
greatly distorting the distribution of wealth, promoting drastic divisions in the standards
of living across the mainland.
Ultimately, the combination of the low wage scales in China and the increasing
level of its skills and technology is one of the greatest challenges which is now fueling
the possibility for long-range competition with the U.S. It is, however, more so the result
of globalization, than any intrinsic advantage China’s economic/industrial model holds
over the United States in terms productive capacity. Instead, China’s edge results from
demographic factors. The much larger population of China, at least 1.2 billion people
compared to 300 million in the U.S., means that China has an abundant labor force at its
disposal, thus the surplus of cheap labor allows its to keep production costs low. At first,
when China limited itself to producing inexpensive low-value products such as toys,
staples and other things, the U.S. found Chinese imports beneficial. It was helpful in
maintaining low inflation rates. As China advances to higher value added products,
however, such as automobiles, computers, aircraft and other items, the U.S is gradually
starting to lose its productive edge. As a result, an increased rivalry is likely to develop.
Given the high skill levels of the Chinese in such areas as mathematics and physics,
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China is likely in the future to become a competitor in high-tech areas, such as the
aircraft industry, that was once long dominated by the United States. Therefore, the
increasing level of competition between China and the U.S. will largely be determined by
which country continues to develop high technology so as to boost their productive edge.
The United States, nevertheless, is confronted with the same challenges by India and
other emerging economies. But, as it has been argued repeatedly throughout this thesis
and will be further demonstrated in this chapter, by the sheer virtue of is size, its growing
military capabilities, expanding diplomatic influence abroad, and purchasing power
China is set apart from the others in respect to the challenges it presents to this country
preeminence. It has the effect of transforming what is generally considered a bilateral
economic struggle into a global power struggle that will greatly mitigate the landscape of
the current international system.
China’s level of openness to the international community during this period of
economic reforms is extremely impressive and historically unique. The United States was
far more isolationist during its economic boom, implementing an array of protective
tariffs to safeguard its domestic economy. 90 In China, however, the dramatic increase in
FDI during the 1990’s through the early years of the twenty first century cannot go
unrecognized. In 1992 alone 8,500 new investment zones were created. 91 It is now
second to the United States in the level of foreign investments it receives. In 1992
following Deng’s promotional southern tour of his SEZs, FDI tripled to $11 billion, then
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tripling again to $34 billion in 1994, and doubling to $61 billion in 2004. 92 In 2003, FDI
accounted for roughly forty percent of China’s overall GDP. Of China’s vast reserves of
FDI, American investment totaled $70 billion worth in contracts in 2003, making the
U.S. and its corporations China’s largest foreign investor. 93
The large influx of foreign investment has been central to China’s emergence a
major economic power because of its role in developing of the country’s industry and
infrastructure. In 1978, one third of China’s industrial production capacity was financed
by half a trillion dollars of foreign investment. 94 Moreover, instead of using its own
reserves to develop the country’s infrastructure and private sector, China uses the large
sums of foreign investment at its disposal to fund its development projects. 95
Furthermore, foreign investment is responsible for boosting China’s extraordinary export
performance, which has, in turn, made China one of the world’s largest trading partners.
It has recently surpassed Japan.
Trade has been an integral part of China’s superior economic performance in the
past decade, as well as a flash point in its economic and political relationship with the
U.S. It was central to Deng’s economic reform strategy and is presently the principal
force propelling China’s annual growth rate of approximately 9.5%. Deng wanted to
move away from the Maoist model of national self-sufficiency by exposing China to the
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benefits of participating in global trade. 96 The influx of foreign investment from the SEZs
provided the means for large increases in China’s export production and thus rapidly
developed the nation’s trading potential. Between 1990 and 2003, China’s total exports
grew eightfold to over $380 billion. 97 Trade accounts for almost half of China’s overall
economy and it has far surpassed the growth of its domestic economy. It currently holds a
trade-to-GDP ratio of 70%. In its relationship with the U.S, China’s trading power is
manifested in the current account deficit the U.S. holds with it. Essentially, the vast
amount of liquidity at China’s disposal from FDIs allows China to save its own reserves
generated from the country’s massive export industry. As noted above, China’s reserves
currently amount to approximately $1.5 trillion and are still growing at rates between $40
to $50 billion per month. Beijing uses this newfound purchasing power to finance
investments abroad as well as a growing level of import consumption. Ultimately, these
reserves and the manner in which China uses them have become a source of China’s
expanding geopolitical influence in the international system.
Those who view China as a potential strategic and security rival, within the U.S.,
are disturbed by these figures for several reasons. First, the vast liquidity and reserves
that China has derived from its export activities, with reserves growing at a level of at
least $200 to $300 million per year, China may now be in a position to outspend the U.S.
on almost any issue. 98 This is most worrisome in security matters, reflected in China’s
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growing defense budget and resource competition, as China moves to seek closer ties
with Venezuela, a critical supply line for U.S. oil imports. Second, when the massive
trade deficit is set against China’s reserves, it contributes to the perception that the U.S. is
making itself too vulnerable to China by conceding its superior position. Thus, China’s
purchase of U.S. treasury bonds and its attempt to take over Unocal several years ago and
its recent investment in several U.S. banks, such as Bear Stearns, and corporations have
left many American officials uncomfortable, in spite of the fact that foreign investments
have been a cornerstone of the U.S. financial system’s success. 99 Third, many
protectionist politicians argue that China is employing unfair mechanisms to boost its
trading advantage, and indirectly its profits, in a manner that is harming critical sectors of
U.S. industry, such as manufacturing. China, on the other hand, is well aware of these
concerns. These disputes and accusations have left the Chinese highly suspicious of the
United States’ actions.
The exaggerated concerns over the possibility of a politically adversarial dynamic
with China in the distant future is forcing these sentiments to spill over into areas of trade
and commerce, even though it has nothing to do with these issues. 100 It has the effect of
creating a dangerous environment in which commercial disputes can turn into matters of
national security. This was precisely the case with CNOOC’s (a state-owned Chinese oil
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firm) failed bid for a stake in American oil firm Unocal.101 These issues are examined in
the following section.
SEC. 2: THE SEPARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FROM TRADE AND
COMMERCE
China’s economic rise has greatly altered the dynamic of its relationship with the
United States. In effect, it has brought greater attention to areas of competing and
opposing interests. At the center of these escalating tensions is a tendency on the part of
the U.S. to link political issues to matters that generally fall under the commercial realm
of trade and investment. This trend is generally motivated by two additional factors to the
ones cited in the previous section. The first is an increasing effort to use trade sanctions
for the purpose of influencing other areas of Chinese government policy. It is
representative of U.S. engagement policy. A unilateral mechanism is used to shape
Chinese interests in ways that are conducive to those of the U.S. In the end, it is more
successful in fueling Chinese resentment and xenophobia than having any substantial
influence of domestic policy matters.
In the past, the most poignant example of this was is in the area of human rights.
Sanctions are still used as a coercive diplomatic stick. However, now they are being used
to influence other policy in areas including trade and finance, as well as the sale of
nuclear technology to rogue states such as Pakistan. Presently, the U.S. government is
attempting to use sanctions as a means to influence the Communist leadership to revalue
the Yuan. Even though these actions fall under what is considered disputes in the
101

This situation clearly illustrated how sensitive Congress and the American public are
becoming towards what has been branded the “China Threat”. In the summer of 2005, the
Chinese oil firm CNOOC made a bid to takeover the American oil firm Unocal. Although
Unocal wells accounted for only one percent of American oil consumption, Congress
blocked the bid on the grounds that it was a threat to national security.
62

economic dialogue, they present unintended consequences for the political dialogue. For
example, China’s staunch opposition to President Bush’s reception of the Dali Lama
conveniently overlapped with Congress’s passing of anti-dumping legislation. The
second concern stems from a mounting consensus amongst many politicians in
Washington that China will one day emerge as a future security rival. Such misguided
perceptions have prompted Congress to turn questions of financial investments into
matters of national security. 102 The difficulty in formulating a rational and cohesive U.S.China policy arises from the tension in separating economic and trade issues from
security issues, human rights issues and purely domestic political issues.
Since 1979, disputes over human rights standards have been at the center of the
two nations’ diverging political views. Yet, the growing importance and benefits of
trading with China challenged the traditional U.S. approach to this issue in the 1990’s.
When any liberal democratic power enters into an economic and political partnership
with a repressive authoritarian regime it is inevitable that there will be conflicting
opinions surrounding human rights standards. Although, China is now a market-based
economy, it is formally still an authoritarian power. The economic reforms implemented
have not translated into greater political freedom for Chinese citizens as many had
predicted it would deliver. There exists, as a result, an ideological gap between the two
powers concerning the primacy of democracy, the implementation of the rule of law, and
basic civil rights and freedoms.
When confronted with any form of political dissent that may threaten their grip on
power, the ruling elite in China systematically resort to the use of repressive tactics in
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order to silence any opposition. Among many of the party’s blatant violations of civil
rights and liberties, judicial conditions are the most corrupt. Trials are often politically
motivated and, therefore, lack the openness that would ensure the deliverance of a just
verdict. In 2005, the U.S. State Department reported that five hundred to six hundred
civilians were imprisoned and charged with “counterrevolutionary activities” for
nonviolent expressions of political views, which now is considered a violation of Chinese
law. 103 In addition, Freedom House’s 2007 report on Human Rights in China concluded
that as many as 250,000 political prisoners lack trials altogether and were detained in
government sponsored “re-education through labor camps”. 104 Many of those who
supported Beijing as the site to host the 2008 Olympics, in spite of protests from various
human rights organizations, argued that it would motivate the Chinese government to
improve the country’s current human rights standards. The recent arrest of Hu Jia,
however, a Beijing based human rights activist just months before the ceremony, proves
that the government will continue to use whatever means necessary to silent dissent so as
to present a unified nation to the world. 105 Beijing wants to present an orderly and stable
society to the global community for the purpose of demonstrating that it is ready to
assume a greater stake in global leadership, as well as attracting more investment.
Clearly, these practices run counter to the liberal democratic order the United
States has been attempting to build across the globe since its emergence as a major power
following World War II. In the past, particularly following the brutal repression of the
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Tiananmen Square protesters in 1989, the U.S. attempted to link the issue of human
rights to trade sanctions in an effort to “punish” the communist leadership’s abhorrent
human rights actions. This policy tool was consistent with the U.S.’s style of engaging
China. When China grossly violated international conduct, it was punished with
sanctions, as it was in 1989. Such a dynamic is representative of most diplomatic
exchanges between stronger and weaker states. This tendency, however, is exacerbated in
the case of the United States. It results primarily from an unremitting inclination on the
part of this country’s leadership towards exercising its policy on a unilateral basis.
Second, there seems to exist a “blind faith,” particularly on the part of our leaders, that
there is some sort of intrinsic power advantage or benefit in a system of liberal
democracy that boosts our leverage in exchanges with authoritarian states. It is
respectfully submitted that this is one of the major flaws of American diplomacy because
it appears to be based upon an exaggerated assumption regarding the power and scope of
our influence. For example, some U.S. diplomatic strategists may be of the view that
when China behaved according to international norms consistent with the standards set
forth by the U.S. it has been further integrated into the international community. China’s
ascension to the WTO in 2001 is often cited as an example of this practice.
Despite this point of view, China’s critical role in global trade is probably more
responsible for its WTO membership than any reward for good behavior. What is
important, however, is that a fair amount of U.S. policy recommendations, including the
view of the U.S. State Department that an increasing adherence, on China’s part, to
international norms as a result of engagement with the U.S., has been a driving force
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behind China’s integration into an array of multilateral international institutions.106 In
fact, the WTO fiasco under the Clinton Administration provides a strong
counterargument to this example. In 1999, the terms of the WTO agreement set forth by
the American delegation were extremely unbalanced. They were drafted in the favor of
U.S. interest and greatly disadvantaged the industrial and agricultural sector in China.
Many Chinese accused Premier Zhu Rongji of being a “national traitor”, comparing him
to the despised emperor Qing that had subjected China to a century of humiliation at the
hands of Western imperialists in the nineteenth century. 107 Many leading members of the
Communist Party argued against WTO membership on the terms stipulated by the U.S. in
their attempts to “engage” China into the global community. Ultimately, it was China’s
growing economy and the necessity to stimulate further growth through the increased
trade opportunities and expanded network of partners a WTO membership would provide
that motivated it to join this organization. In this respect, China’s engagement with the
U.S. obstructed rather than encouraged integration.
For these reasons, it is the view of this thesis that such assumption about the
U.S.’s influence distorts the level of power U.S. policy has over shaping Chinese
behavior. Thus, when China starts to act contrary to U.S. interests, there is a
miscalculated belief that somehow the U.S. can unilaterally correct its behavior. Perhaps
in the past this may have been plausible. Yet, given the decline in U.S. authority in
matters of this nature, there needs to be a greater incentive for the U.S. to cooperate with
our allies and act multilaterally within set institutions if we are to successfully persuade
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Beijing to alter course on issues of human rights. Continuing to act unilaterally will only
create more strife in this already tense relationship.
Ultimately, however, the attempt to link human rights to trade only created deeper
strains than the ones this policy tactic was trying to correct. China considered the U.S. to
be infringing upon its sovereignty. Since one of the central features of Chinese foreign
policy has consistently been its refusal to impose sanctions in response to what it
considers the “internal affairs” of states, China concluded the U.S was infringing upon its
sovereignty. 108 The diverging opinions over what constitutes “internal affairs” and when
it is legitimate to intervene in those affairs, has been a major source of the ideological
differences that have given rise to a majority of the disputes between China and the U.S.
in their diplomatic relationship. The issues of human rights and trade sanctions
collectively fall under this umbrella. Within Beijing, the idea of linking human rights to
trade was perceived as a grand scheme of manipulation on the part the Western powers,
particularly the U.S, as a pretext to control China’s domestic affairs. Additionally, since
China’s leadership regards sustained economic growth to be the most vital of national
interests, any measures, such as trade sanctions on Chinese imports to the U.S. are
perceived as a direct challenge to the well being of the nation. In turn, such measures
create greater strains in the political dialogue between China and the U.S. In this
situation, Beijing perceives that it is being contained rather than engaged.
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Invariably, the emergence of China as a major global trading partner in the 1990s
rendered the use of trade sanctions an unsound policy choice for the U.S in its attempt to
introduce a more acceptable level of human rights standards. The growing importance to
the U.S. economy of trading with China, particularly the role of such trade in keeping
inflation rates down, prompted President Clinton in 1994 to separate trade policy from
the issue of human rights in the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship. 109 Today, it would
be highly unlikely that the U.S. government would step up diplomatic pressure on the
Chinese government regarding human rights issues through use of trade sanctions. China
is no longer a substantially weaker economic power. Moreover, the existing trade deficit
between China and the U.S. inhibits the U.S.’s ability to step up its pressure on political
issues, such as human rights, by relying upon sanctions. Furthermore, China’s WTO
membership makes it virtually impossible for the U.S. to impose such sanctions
unilaterally. This is not to say, however, that the United States should abandon its efforts
to encourage political reform that would allow for a more open society in China. Rather,
it means that as U.S. economic power declines in relation to China’s, we must formulate
new mechanisms of engagement and integration that place a greater emphasis on
multilateralism, as contrasted with the traditional unilateral route. Alternative policies for
addressing the conflicts over human rights will be further explored in chapter four. In
order better to understand the limitations on the level of “tough love” diplomacy that the
United States successfully employs with China, it is helpful to take account of the
massive trade deficit the U.S. has accumulated with China over the years.
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Currently, China’s mounting trade surplus with the United States has become
probably one of the most important issues in the bilateral relations between the two. It is
a major point of contention in the strategic economic dialogue and trade summits. Since
the 1980s, there has existed increasing trade surplus between China and the U.S. It
continued to rise steadily throughout the 1990s. As the result of this mounting deficit,
China is now the most important agent in sustaining the overall balance between the U.S.
trade deficit and the inflow to the U.S. of foreign investment. 110 Many officials are
concerned that this leaves the U.S. in a subordinate position to China because of this
increased dependence upon Chinese investment in the United States, especially the
purchase of U.S. Treasury securities to provide the need for capital to fund the operations
of the U.S. government. Thus, by way of example, in 2005, when “the U.S. bilateral trade
deficit with China reached $202 billion, accounting for a record 26 percent of the total
U.S. global trade deficit of $782 billion”, China’s growing trade surplus became a
formidable source of tension in its trade relationship with the U.S. 111 There is a general
consensus amongst economists that, in order to rectify the trade imbalance and prevent
the margin from increasing, U.S. exports to China would have to grow approximately sixfold in comparison to its imports from China. 112 These statistics have led many in
Congress to peg China as a mercantilist trader and the primary culprit behind the growing
rate of unemployment in the U.S., especially in the manufacturing industry.
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The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has accused China of employing an array of
questionable tactics with the intention of artificially increasing its exports in order to
maintain the current trade deficit, sustain its trade leverage over the U.S. and generate
substantial annual addition to China's holding of foreign currency in its reserves. 113 Of
these, the most highly contested issues include the undervaluation of the Yuan, the
Chinese currency, as well as the violation of intellectual property rights. Ultimately, the
reason for this growing trade surplus and the challenges it presents to the U.S. economy,
are complex and multidimensional. These are issues that extend far beyond the subject
matter of this thesis. Nonetheless, what is relevant are new developments unfolding
within the U.S. government that seek to address and resolve these outstanding issues
concerning fair trading practices. Recently, a flood of new legislation has been introduced
to Congress proposing higher barriers to Chinese exports and strong anti-dumping
regulations. 114 This trend suggests the U.S. is pursuing an alternative unilateral route to
the current administrations’ insistence on utilizing multilateral organizations, such as the
WTO, to promote a more balanced dialogue concerning the existing trade disputes.
In the months leading up to the November presidential election, U.S. lawmakers
have introduced various pieces of legislation that would impose tougher sanctions on
China as a way of pressuring the government to revaluate the currency and address other
areas of outstanding trade disputes. It is from the Democratic side of the aisle that this
effort has been most persistent. Both frontrunners for the Democratic presidential
113
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nomination, Hillary Clinton and Barrack Obama, are endorsing this tougher approach
toward China. 115 With the possibility of a recession still at bay, the Democratic Party
wants to prove it will be tough on economic issues. In this thesis, I take the position, that
such measures would be deleterious not only to the economic health of the nation and its
trade relationship with China, but also to the political relationship between China and the
U.S. as well. Such measures will ultimately deteriorate the existing good will between
China and the U.S. and contribute to growing levels of hostility between the two states.
The language of this new legislation is dangerously protectionist and has the effect of
sending mixed messages to China.
Christopher Padilla, the deputy undersecretary of commerce, recently remarked:
Such measures run the risk of inflating consumer prices at a time of economic
uncertainty, bringing about trade retaliation that would stifle our exports, and
setting back efforts to promote reform in China -- while doing nothing to reduce
the bilateral trade deficit. 116

The implementation of such legislation would advance the perception in China that the
U.S. is attempting to contain its rise, creating an adversarial environment brooding
mistrust, not only for economic but also diplomatic exchanges. Additionally, acting
unilaterally on this issue may create greater problems for the U.S. beyond is relationship
with China. In particular, it could create strains in the U.S. /E.U. trade relationship that
would be very harmful to the economic stability of the U.S. Thus, the U.S. should
collaborate more closely with the E.U. in seeking a solution to these issues. Moreover,
because of the low wage scale in China and, on the other hand, the high level of technical
capacity, Chinese manufacturing is likely, on a continuing basis, to undercut
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manufacturing costs in the U.S. regardless of the exchange level between the Yuan and
the dollar. Therefore, passing such legislation would do little to solve the problem at
hand, while fueling sentiments of xenophobia and suspicion in Beijing that will get in the
way of more pressing diplomatic disputes.
If the Democrats want to prove that they hold an alternative view to the Bush
Administration on the potential threat posed by China, they must first represent that threat
correctly. First of all, the increasing importance of the economy to constituents in this
presidential election has little to do with the level of Chinese exports to this country.
Rather, it has more to do with the ramifications of the subprime mortgage crisis
precipitated by the greed and poor judgment of the major banks of Wall Street, as
contrasted with to the exploitation of unfair trading practices by China. This style of
overzealous corporate governance has plunged the United States into an economic crisis
far greater than that caused by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
Today, we live in a world where globalization is moving at a rapid pace and free
trade is the modus operandi. Protectionism retards progress. Instead of instituting
safeguards to level the playing field, this country needs to start investing more heavily in
research and development to innovate and keep up. Competition in trade and industry is
healthy. In the 1980s when the U.S. found itself engaged in a heavy competition with
Japan, this competition had the effect of spurring industrial innovations and producing
tremendous benefits. Frankly, this country has gone unchallenged for too long and the
rate of technological and intellectual innovation has suffered as a result. The “China
threat” is awakening a dormant industry in this country, in a way similar to the 1980’s
“Japan threat”.
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SEC. 3: RESOURCE WARS
The strong emphasis these stated pieces of legislation are placing on restricting
China’s exports to this country shows that the U.S. government is missing the point about
the source of China’s economic power. 117 It is not the increased competition in the field
of trade that is the real threat to the United States, but rather it is the growing competition
for energy and other finite natural resources that is most worrisome in the long run. In
this arena, the fact that China is gaining greater leverage over the U.S. comes not from its
ability to sell, but rather is growing role as an important global consumer and investor at
a time when U.S consumption is declining. 118 Thus, in light of this information, the
revaluation of the Yuan will do little to harness China’s ability to outspend and out
compete with the U.S. This outspending, for example, is most clearly reflected in Africa
where the Export-Import Bank of China readily makes available huge, unrestricted
funding for infrastructure projects. In return, it gives China the ability in large petroleum
producing countries, such as Nigeria and Angola, to obtain large stakes in promising
petroleum and natural gas projects. 119 Therefore, this program of unrestricted imports
from China helps to fund the country’s growing economic clout in the world.
Accordingly, the business of imports has become China’s greatest diplomatic tool.
China’s growing level of consumption of natural resources, such as petroleum, natural

117

Ziegler, Dominic. "Reaching for a Renaissance." Special Report on China and
its Region; The Economist. March 31st-April 6th 2007, (after p. 58; Report
Inclusive 3-18). P.6
118

Ibid
Broadman, Harry G. “China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the Developing
World”. Foreign Affairs March/ April 2008; Vol. 87, Is. 2 (2008) [inclusive online p. 14].
119

73

gas, iron ore, copper and similar items, has made other countries dependent on it for
investment.
This is at the root of China’s growing geopolitical influence abroad. Furthermore,
it has been advantageous in the race to secure energy supply lines. Presently, China and
the U.S. have not yet entered into a fierce competition for natural resources. More
specifically, neither one has tapped into the supply lines of the other. Nevertheless, the
increased demand, compared with the relative supply of these finite resources, especially
in regards to oil, has contributed to the perception that the emergence of a strategic
competition between the two is highly probable in the near future. Moreover, the
increased demand of China and India for natural resources and other commodities has
substantially increased the cost of these items. When taken together with China’s military
development, it is this fact that motivates realists and conservative hawks to conclude that
China, much in the same way that the former Soviet Union did during the Cold War, will
inevitably emerge as a security rival to the United States. 120 Ultimately, the world cannot
satisfy the appetite of both China and the U.S. at the current rate they are growing. These
are issues that can be resolved only through the adoption of clear and innovative policies,
the development of new technologies, including the greater use of hydrogen based power,
rather than protectionist policies and "cheek to jowl" competition for natural resources.
Such solutions are discussed in the following chapter.
Beijing’s program for modernization and economic growth has not come cheap.
These developments are responsible for transforming China into the world’s second
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largest importer of oil after the United States, with the most rapid growth in demand. 121
Its need for other finite resources such as aluminum, nickel, copper, and iron ore have
risen from seven percent of world demand in 1990 to a forecast of forty percent by
2010. 122 The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and its ability to preserve its
power, depends on sustaining an annual growth rate of nearly ten percent, which creates
about twenty four million new jobs each year.123 As a result, the pursuit for energy and
resources to maintain the current levels of economic growth is now a driving force behind
China’s foreign policy.
During an era of international relations that has been branded “the geopolitics of
scarcity”, Beijing’s relentless quest to satisfy China’s insatiable appetite for energy is
likely to draw it directly into strategic and diplomatic conflicts with the United
Statesunless technological development can be harnessed to provide, new, plentiful
sources of energy. 124 The distortion between the growing demand for oil in relation to its
limited supply is creating a debilitating impact on the balance of power within the
international system. In relation to the diplomatic issues I address in this thesis, namely,
those concerning nuclear proliferation and military intervention in the internal affairs of
sovereign states, China’s necessity to secure petroleum supply lines is at the center of
these disputes. Beijing’s need to gain access to increasing amounts of energy has a
tendency to inhibit its willingness to collaborate with the international community when
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its interest, namely, when its energy supply lines run the risk of being comprised. 125
Beijing has sought to fortify ties with suppliers that have been diplomatically isolated by
Washington. Of these, China’s relationships with Iran and Sudan are the most notable
because of the diplomatic power struggle they have inspired between China and the U.S.
in the international forum of the United Nations.
Nuclear Proliferation: Iran
Iran and the United States have been locked in a ferocious battle for regional
dominance in the Middle East for years. The latest manifestation of this power struggle is
the contentious debate surrounding the purpose and future of Iran’s uranium enrichment
program. Since 2006, the United States, joined by Britain and France, has strongly argued
that the purpose of Iran’s uranium enrichment program is to develop nuclear weapons. In
a period when tensions between the United States and Iran seem to have peeked,
combined with President Ahmadinejad’s incessant inflammatory remarks concerning the
future of Israel, makes the prospect of Iran obtaining such technology worrisome to many
American and Western officials. However, the Iranian government continues to maintain
that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes.
Enlisting China’s support in confronting the nuclear proliferation threat posed by
Iran is a far greater challenge for U.S. diplomats than in the case of North Korea.
Working to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program was directly in China’s interest.
Yet in the case of Iran, for China’s leadership, it appears that the costs of confronting Iran
on this issue would outweigh any benefits. China’s international behavior has not yet
proved that it is willing to sacrifice its own interests for a cause from which it does not
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derive economic benefit. What is more to the point is that the strategic ties between
China and Iran date back to the days of the Silk Road. In regards to trade, and access to
resources, there has been a long and solid foundation between the two states. Thus,
Beijing does not share Washington’s disdain for the Iranian government. Additionally,
while China does oppose Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, it is not necessarily
convinced that the program for uranium enrichment was created for this purpose. China,
in collaboration with Russia, has used its veto in the U.N. Security Council to block
efforts that would bring Iran’s nuclear program under the U.S. inspection regime.
Yet, the greatest factor obstructing China’s cooperation is its dependence on Iranian
oil. In 2003, 13% of China’s oil imports came from Iran. 126 Over the past four years,
China’s oil procurement ties with Iran have been growing at stunning rates. In 2004,
Sinopec, the state-owned Chinese Petrochemical Corporation, signed a $70 billion, thirtyyear deal to buy liquefied natural gas from Iran. 127 This arrangement brought China’s
total deals for Iranian petroleum to approximately $100 billion. On December 11, 2007,
this deal was augmented when Sinopec committed another $2 billion to develop the
Yadavaran oil field in Iran. This latter agreement followed through on a prior provision
that had been set forth in the 2004 deal. In four years, the field will develop 85,000
barrels of oil a day, with an additional 100,000 barrels a day in another three years. 128
This latest agreement was signed shortly after the CIA released a report, citing that it may
have miscalculated Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. Prior to the declassification
of this report, China was on the brink of supporting the imposition of tougher sanctions
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on Iran, which it had continuously resisted within the U.N. Securing closer cooperation
with China on this issue now will be a tremendous burden for the next administration
given China’s growing demand for oil supplies and its increasing diplomatic ties with
Tehran. It is likely to be a formidable source of tension in the future course of U.S.Chinese diplomatic relations.
The Debate over Military intervention in the sovereign affairs of statesÆ Sudan
Since 1997 the U.S. has implemented a policy forbidding American corporations
from engaging in any business operations in Sudan as a consequence of the bloody war
between the Muslim government in Khartoum and the Christian rebels in the south. 129
Shortly after 1997, China moved in to fill the economic vacuum in Chad left by the
United States, thereby giving China access to the vast amount of Sudanese petroleum
reserves to satisfy its increasing energy demands. Sixty percent of Sudan’s oil is exported
to China. 130 In return, China has supplied the Sudanese government with weapons and
financed the construction of arms factories. As a result of its close ties with Sudan’s
government, China has come under harsh international criticism for these actions. China
has been accused of essentially underwriting the genocide in Darfur that has left at least
300,000 dead. When China’s ambassador to Washington, Zhou Wenzhong, was asked to
respond to these allegations, he said: “Business is Business. We try to separate politics
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from business, and in any case the internal position of Sudan is an internal affair, and we
are not in a position to influence them.” 131
Within the U.N. Security Council, China, joined by Russia, has repeatedly blocked
any measures that would adopt tougher measures to stop the genocide. While China’s
reluctance to interfere in the “internal affairs” of Sudan is consistent with the five
principles of its foreign policy, in this respect, it is more motivated by its demand for oil
than other considerations. To a lesser extent, Beijing fears that interfering in these events
may bring greater scrutiny on its own domestic abuses and violations of human rights.
These two cases, of Iran and Sudan, contribute to a growing consensus in
Washington that China is developing a foreign policy that is actively hostile to human
rights and international law, a combination that, on the surface, seems incongruent with
U.S. foreign policy. 132 Meanwhile, in China, the leadership refutes these attacks on the
grounds that the United States is just as guilty of choosing which international laws to
obey and which it can rightfully ignore. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is often invoked, as
well as the gross abuses of power at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.
The declining international power of the U.S. means it no longer in a position to
impose standards it will not follow itself. More importantly, when considering the scope
of these conflicts, it is critical to keep in mind that workable solutions to these disputes
do exist. Chinese foreign policy is largely motivated by the pragmatic necessity for
petroleum as opposed to some deep-seated ideological conviction in regard to these
issues. In fact, China has recently adopted a tougher stance towards the government of
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Sudan, which suggests that it may be altering course on this issue and responding to
pressures by the international community. 133 This new development is given greater
attention in the chapter that follows. Additionally, while the idea may be morally
abhorrent, the U.S., in fact, benefits from China’s engagement with these pariah states. It
is China’s willingness to deal with not only Iran and Sudan, but other states like
Uzbekistan and Angola that help obstruct the possibility for direct confrontation with the
U.S. In a certain way, it can be said that China’s access to these alternatives keep it from
impeding on the supply lines that are vital to the U.S. interest, thereby preventing the
occurrence of a strategic competition similar to the one between the U.S and the former
Soviet Union during the Cold War. Therefore, U.S. policy makers find themselves in
somewhat of a “catch-22” situation as regards China’s sourcing of petroleum from Iran
and Sudan. Pushing China to take a tougher position on these issues with the
governments of Iran and Sudan may alienate them from these supply lines, in turn forcing
Beijing to seek closer ties with petroleum producing governments that are considered
U.S. suppliers.
Beginnings of a Strategic Rivalry in Latin America?
Yet, there are those who argue, however, that this scenario is already beginning to
out in Latin America. China’s increasing ties with the government of Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela is seen as a potential source of conflict with the U.S. in this respect. Despite
the fact that diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Venezuela have deteriorated
significantly since Mr. Chavez’s ascendance to power, Caracas remains an important oil
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supplier to the U.S. It supplies the U.S. with about three million barrels a day. 134 In light
of the growing demand for oil, Mr. Chavez has attempted to boost Venezuela’s
international power by expanding the country’s client base. It provides him with greater
diplomatic leverage over the U.S. By opening the country to new investors, he can
effectively threaten to redirect the critical supply to the U.S. if the U.S. government
should attempt to interfere with Mr. Chavez’s tight grip on power. Playing off the
perceived power struggle between China and the U.S., Mr. Chavez has most actively
sought to attract Chinese investment to Venezuela’s oil industry. On a visit to Beijing in
2004, in his provocative manner, Mr. Chavez remarked “how he wanted to put
Venezuelan oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland after 100 years of
American domination.” 135 Shortly thereafter in 2005, he signed an agreement with the
Chinese government that would allow for $3 billion of Chinese investments in
Venezuela’s oil industry. The possibility of a strategic partnership between China and
Venezuela is disconcerting to U.S. policymakers because satisfying China’s demands
may result in limiting supplies to the U.S. However, it would also be an exaggeration to
cite this example as China’s attempt to move into an important area of the United States’
sphere of interest.
It is critical to understand that the countries of South America are developing
nations. While their growth may not garner as much attention as China, they too must
find ways to finance programs for economic and industrial development. From this point
of view, China is then more of a supplementary investor than a rival. But given the
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anxieties in the U.S. surrounding the rise of China, coupled with the tendency of the U.S.
to adopt an offensive position in matters of this type, it is unlikely that the U.S.
government would adopt such a rational interpretation. Thus, China will most likely be
viewed as a competitor as opposed to a partner in Latin America.
The solution to such complex problems can be relatively simple. However, neither
China nor the U.S. seemed committed to pursuing such a route. For example, it is
undeniable that a more effective energy policy would correct many of the diplomatic
grievances existing between China and the U.S. regarding the disputes over nuclear
proliferation and military intervention in Sudan. Additionally, it would limit the ability of
rogue petroleum producing states from exploiting the international balance of power to
boost their own national interests and global authority.
In the end, working to develop more sustainable energy policies could potentially
be the most viable departure point for collaboration between the U.S. and China. Neither
country is benefiting from soaring oil prices and the potential rivalry that is likely to
develop as a result of the combination of: (i) higher price petroleum; (ii) increased
demand; and (iii) limited and finite supplies of petroleum. For realists, it is this potential
strategic rivalry over resources that could precipitate the possibility of a security rivalry
between China and the United States. China’s implementation of these aggressive
policies in its pursuit of these resources, coupled with its expanding military capabilities
contributes to the advancement of this perception of China as a future belligerent.
SEC. 4: SECURITY CHALLENGES: TAIWAN AND CHINA’S MILITARY
DEVELOPMENT
It is clear that China’s growing economic clout is rivaling that of the United States
in such a way that its effects are not solely confined to the boundaries of this bilateral
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relationship. In the previous section it was demonstrated that Beijing now has “soft
power” and a strong diplomatic influence extending far beyond its own regional
peripheries. 136 Thus, regardless of the pervasive domestic ailments that may prevent
China from reaching a “superpower” status, it is emerging as a formidable force in the
international system. Just as President Nixon so accurately predicted in 1972, no stable
international order can be sustained without its collaboration. In this regard, China has
the effect of challenging the conventional distribution of power within the current system
that greatly favors the position of the United States.
According to structural realism, these realities indicate that a security conflict
between the U.S. and China may be inevitable. 137 Realists and neoconservatives cite the
considerable military build up within the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as
evidentiary support for this theoretical claim. This fact is, in addition, one of the biggest
elements fueling mounting concerns over the potential security threat China poses to the
United States.
Although China’s leadership has persistently claimed it seeks to preserve the
character of its “peaceful rise”, at face glance, the statistics of its growing defense budget
seem overwhelmingly to support the image of China as a rival of the U.S. as contrasted
with a partner in security matters. China’s military budget has been growing at doubledigit rates for years with some figures indicating as much as an 18% rise for 2008. 138
What is troubling is not necessarily the expansion of China’s military, but that, as its
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power increases, the PLA remains extremely elusive about the extent of its capabilities.
This tendency is consistent with the country’s overall approach to foreign policy. The
Communist leadership remains ambiguous about China’s national objectives, presenting
them in the form of cryptic slogans as contrasted with a clearly defined set of national
security goals. Since the 1980’s the guiding principle behind the country’s foreign policy
has been, “to preserve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, [and
to] create a favorable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and
modernization.” 139 While these goals reflect the current pattern of China’s international
behavior, especially within its own region, they leave many questions about its future
intentions, particularly with regard to the political status of Taiwan, unanswered.
The question of Taiwan, above all other security concerns, is most central to the
stability of U.S.-China diplomatic relations. Currently, it is the only security mission
posing a realistic threat for a potential military conflict between the two states because of
the U.S.’s security obligation to the island set forth by the Taiwan Relations Act. China
remains in stern opposition of the U.S.’ sale of weapons to Taiwan. Chapter two
explained the origins of this conflict in great detail length. Today, while much of
Beijing’s foreign policy is guided by pragmatism, the issue of Taiwan remains one based
virtually entirely upon ideological motivations. 140 In part, this results from the perception
that Taiwan’s continued separation from the mainland is a lasting reminder of China’s
“century of humiliation”. 141 With the disintegration of Communism’s ideological appeal,
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the party’s ability to return the territories of Hong Kong and Macao to the mainland in
many ways legitimized the authority of the Communist regime by reversing this historic
“sentiment of humiliation.” Yet, the inability to reintegrate the government of Taipei
remains a constant reminder of the Communist party’s shortcomings. The Communist
leadership, as a result, continues to view the capitalist democratic government of Taiwan
as a threat to its hold on power. As China’s economic success continues to deliver greater
opportunities for social mobility, the government in Taipei presents itself as model for
political dissidents on the mainland. As a thriving pluralist state, it is an attractive
alternative to the current system of authoritarian rule in China, void of political freedoms.
Beijing’s persistent demand for “One China” is, therefore, used as a nationalist rallying
point to unify the country behind the party’s rule.
Internationally, Beijing continues diplomatically to isolate Taiwan. It uses its
tremendous purchasing power to advance this aim. In 2005, at the UN General Assembly,
President Hu Jintao offered debt forgiveness and duty-free entry to exports from the
world’s poorest countries, with the exception of those who recognized the government of
Taipei. 142 Since 1979, China’s official policy has called for a “peaceful reunification”
under the concept of the “One Country, Two systems” formula outlined in chapter two.
However, in March 2005, the Chinese government passed the “Anti-Secession Law”. It
was for the purpose of codifying both China’s peaceful unification policy but also its
willingness to implement “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” to prevent
the possibility of an indefinite separation. 143 Ultimately, the unstated intention of this law
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was to remind Taiwan that any claim for statehood would be interpreted as a declaration
of secession, in which case Beijing reserves the right to exercise military force.
Taken against the backdrop of this information, China’s military build up,
especially along the strait, has many within the security apparatus of the U.S. government
concerned that China is preparing for an invasion of Taiwan. The Pentagon estimates that
China has significantly increased “the number, reliability, and accuracy of its ballistic
missiles deployed across from Taiwan to roughly eight hundred, with about one hundred
new missiles deployed a year.” 144 Based on these figures, many military analysts have
concluded that the balance of military power has tilted in China’s favor on the issue of
Taiwan. It is the vast size of such a deployment that reaffirms this belief. A mobilization
of this size would allow Beijing to disable the government in Taipei, disrupt
communications and coerce Taiwan into some sort of negotiations before the U.S. Navy
even had time to intervene. 145
Conflict over Taiwan, however, is not inevitable. Furthermore, the likelihood of a
Chinese attack in the foreseeable future is limited. Beijing has sought to develop strong
economic ties with the government of Taiwan so as to provide a greater incentive to
integrate with the mainland, much the same way the E.U. does with possible candidates
for membership. Furthermore, the defeat of the nationalist party in Taiwan’s recent
elections provides a brighter prospect for closer collaboration that could one day lead to a
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peaceful reunification with the mainland. These developments are discussed at great
lengths in the following chapter. What is rather disconcerting, however, is that in the past,
the divergent opinions over Taiwan did not have the effect of triggering such inimical
perceptions of one another in diplomatic exchanges between China and the U.S.
This new trend regarding the diverging opinions over Taiwan is indicative of the
perception within prominent U.S. government and military circles that China is trying to
replace the U.S. as the dominant power in the Asian-Pacific region, a position the U.S.
has held since the Korean War. Even though China has not yet fully emerged as a “peer
competitor”, and there is no guarantee that it even will, the United States has already
embarked on a path to contain that possibility.
This strategy is dangerous because it has the effect of a creating tensions and
fostering a hostile environment during a time of peace. In the past and present, the United
States has demonstrated that it does not tolerate challenges to its regional dominance and
has consistently acted unilaterally to preserve its power. 146 On a grand scale, this was
clearly illustrated during the Cold War conflict. Presently, and to a lesser extent, the
United States is engaged in a similar power struggle with Iran to maintain its post in the
Middle East.
Now, there are early warning signs that the same scenario is playing out with
China. When the U.S. moved to sign a bilateral military agreement with India, outside of
the legal and institutional scope of the multilaterally organizations created to oversee
such arrangements, concerns started to mount in Beijing over the possibility of
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encirclement. Thus, the United States is equally guilty of the duplicity it accuses Beijing
of in terms of security matters.
This fact, combined with the mounting support for trade barriers against Chinese
exports in Congress, contributes to the perception in China that, while the U.S. preaches
engagement, it is clandestinely pursuing a policy of containment. From this viewpoint,
China believes it must take measures to protect itself in the event of a conflict with the
U.S. over Taiwan. China’s sizeable military build-up is one example.
Consequently, while the U.S. believes it is protecting itself against a future
adversary, its actions are ultimately self-defeating. The U.S.’s insistence to act
unilaterally on these security matters, instead of pushing for greater transparency on
China’s military capabilities within the apparatus of the multilateral institutions of which
China is a member (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the ASEAN
Regional Forum), has the effect of deepening Chinese concerns of xenophobia and
nationalism within Beijing that are becoming increasingly anti-American. By this, I am
not arguing that the United States should ignore the sizeable build up of China’s military
and its implications for future security relations. Rather, in order to maintain the stability
and peace of the Asian-Pacific, a generally volatile region, this thesis suggests the U.S.
should go about defusing this issue in a way that does not cater to China’s historic fear of
encirclement by Western powers and its neighbors. In chapter two, it was demonstrated
that Nixon and Kissinger were able to pacify similar anxieties in respect to closer
collaboration between the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. by exchanging critical military
intelligence with Beijing to promote an atmosphere of trust. I will discuss viable
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approaches to implementing alternative strategies in the present relationship in the next
chapter.
SEC. 5: ARE RIVALRY AND CONFLICT INEVITABLE?
This chapter has shown that the problems confronting U.S.-China relations cannot
be categorized separately into economic and political issues. The picture must look to a
whole series of other more critical issues, such as the increased competition and the effect
it has on the price of energy, particularly petroleum and natural gas. These realities in
turn, inspire diplomatic conflicts over areas, such as nuclear proliferation and military
intervention, in which the political differences between the two states are deepened by
their unyielding demand for energy supplies. Ultimately, none of these disputes mean that
a security conflict between China and the U.S. is inevitable, or that it is even a possibility.
Rather, it is indicative of growing strains and mutual suspicions that have the potential of
creating an atmosphere of mistrust for future diplomatic exchanges.
While these developments are relatively new and it is entirely too soon to brand
them a pattern in U.S.-China relations, they are early warning signs that should not be
overlooked. It is insufficient for the current administration to rely on China’s
participation in the free market system to alter its behavior in a way that is more
conducive with international norms. Yet, this alone will inevitably fail to produce a more
amicable atmosphere for this relationship. This reality results from the most fundamental
limitation inhibiting the integrating power of the free market system: while “trade
increases the mutual economic dependence of the countries that engage in it, trade does
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not make the peoples of those nations any fonder of one another.” 147 Therefore, the
United States must actively seek to construct a more acceptable forum for diplomatic
exchanges with China that emphasizes multilateralism and, when possible, collaboration
instead of unilateral policies and increased competition. Of course, such actions will not
always be feasible. However, if the latter approach is adopted, when collaboration is not
possible, relations will not dramatically deteriorate because of inconsequential disputes
over minor commercial matters as they have recently.

CHAPTER 4:

Grounding the Rise of China
and Policy Recommendations for
Improving U.S.-China Relations
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This chapter provides a critical analysis of alternative policy solutions aimed to
reduce the levels of escalating tensions between China and the U.S. Generally speaking,
this thesis agrees with existing studies recommending that the U.S. should seek to limit
the potential for future conflict with China by emphasizing both: (i) our mutual interests;
and (ii) the necessity for collaboration. At the same time, in the face of an obvious and
increased level of competition with China, these policies must be formulated in a manner
that incorporates strategies to safeguard U.S. interests in light of China’s growing
economic, diplomatic, and military power. In the international system, this type of
competitive dynamic between a “rising challenger state”, China, and the existing “great
power”, the United States, is natural. At the moment, it remains unclear whether this type
of ensuing competition between the two powers will give way to a direct security conflict
or Cold War type strategic rivalry. Some observers have argued that this level of
increased competition is an early manifestation of the type of power transitions that have
the capacity to restructure the international order.
Traditional realist theory indicates that, when this type of transitional dynamic
emerges, namely one that heralds profound shifts in the global distribution of power
among states, it is marked by periods of war and instability. 148 Proponents of this theory
maintain that competition between states gives way to conflict and rivalry because the
“rising challenger state” wants to enhance its newfound geopolitical power to restructure
the existing system in a way that better serves its own self-interests. Naturally, the
existing power views the rising power as a direct threat to its predominance and relative
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security. As the rising states’ power increases relative to the declining position of the
existing state, the possibility of war is enhanced resulting from the increased level of
insecurity and mistrust amongst states. In a “unipolar” world order, such as the one today,
the possibility of war or strategic rivalry amongst powers during a transitional period is
exacerbated. The dominant states’ monopoly on power increases the likelihood that it
will interpret a rising states behavior in a more threatening and adversarial light.
According to his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that in this type
of system a security conflict between China and the U.S. is inevitable because a great
power, such as the U.S., “that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to
behave more aggressively because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do
so.” 149 This thesis opposes his view and argues that a security conflict between China and
the U.S. is not inevitable. In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate why and how the U.S.’s
response to China’s rise can override the predisposition of the international system to
foster turbulence and conflict in similar circumstances.
The first step in preparing such a response will require U.S. policy makers to
measure any potential challenges China’s rise presents to the United States and the
existing status quo of the international system against the forces limiting the scope of
China’s international power. Presenting a more balanced and realistic image of China
will help to reduce the possibility of those types of misperceptions responsible for
precipitating conflict between states. Sound policies are based on reality, not the
perception of reality. The first section of this chapter outlines the forces inhibiting
China’semergence as a future belligerent. The analysis offers support for the alternative
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view: in many ways China is meeting the Bush Administration’s demand that it become a
“responsible stakeholder” in the international system. 150 In this chapter, I maintain there
are both internal and external factors limiting adventurism in Chinese foreign policy. By
nature, however, these factors are extremely complex and diverse. Consequently, in order
to provide a more cohesive analysis of the elements limiting China’s aggressive behavior
and minimizing the risk of a security conflict with this U.S. in the near future, this
chapter limits its focus to the growing levels of social unrest within the country as well as
the economic interdependence existing between China, the United States, and the
international community.
Based on the evidence provided, I maintain that an outright security conflict
between China and the U.S. in the near future is highly unlikely. However, given the
heightened competition for natural resources and China’s growing influence its region,
the conclusion is expressed that the same level of confidence cannot be reached when
determining or predicting the prospects for a potential strategic rivalry between the two
powers. While the realities of globalization make a Cold War type of rivalry unlikely, the
U.S.’s response, if miscalculated, and Chinese enormous size combined would be
powerful enough to reverse this trend. In the event that either power reaches the
conclusion that the other constitutes a national security threat, both China and the U.S.
share certain characteristics allowing them to advance their relative security position visà-vis one another in ways that could pose negative consequences for the stability of the
international order. In this respect, their massive economies allow them to “calculate their
spheres of military, diplomatic, and economic influence. Each may be are prepared to use
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military power to achieve national ends.” 151 Each country holds a historical conviction
that its preeminent position in the world is preordained by destiny and serves as a
mandate to strive for or protect this end. 152 Such qualities provide both China and the U.S.
the ability to fragment the existing order into spheres of competing interests, that might
give rise to the same type of violence and stability intrinsic to the power politics of
nineteenth century Europe and the Cold War in spite of the intricate interdependencies
facilitated by globalization. Although these traits make the present competition between
China and the U.S. more susceptible to this type of strategic rivalry, they by no means
make such a possibility inevitable. It is, however, a “slippery slope.” Therefore, U.S.
policy makers need to formulate and develop policies based on a realistic analysis of
China’s objectives that narrows the room for misperceptions in order to prevent the
current level of natural and necessary competition from “snowballing” into this type of
destabilizing rivalry. The concluding section of this chapter is a critical analysis of
existing policy recommendations seeking to enhance the positive nature and mutual
goodwill of U.S.-China relations.

SEC. 1: GROUNDING THE RISING CHINA
Domestic Constraints on China’s behavior
The mainstream media is culpable of grossly exaggerating China’s capabilities in
relation to those of the United States. Such a distorted representation of China’s
economic success does not take into consideration the multitude of challenges that
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threaten to offset its current course. Thus, when Americans read about China’s $1 trillion
dollar economy, many mistakenly, but nonetheless erroneously, overlook the fact that
China is still a developing nation. Therefore, in spite of its economic achievements,
China faces the same domestic obstacles that confront any state undergoing a rigorous
program of economic reform and development. Any sound assessment of the potential
threat posed by China to the U.S. requires one to consider these basic realities.
In the course of the research for this thesis, I found that, virtually all of the
mainstream publications (the major sources for informing American public opinion) in
their discussions of the rise of China, invariably note that, provided China sustains its
current level of economic growth, it will eventually surpass the United States as the
world’s largest economy. In a number of respects, such conclusions fail to note certain
important qualifications. Many of these articles neglected to mention that, if China does,
in fact, manage to preserve its current levels of growth, surpassing the U.S. as the world’s
largest economy is not likely to occur until 2035. 153 Recent events, however, have
clouded the accuracy of this estimate from several conflicting standpoints. On the one
hand, since this prediction was made prior to the damage inflicted by the subprime
mortgage fiasco on the U.S. economy, it presupposes the U.S.’s ability to recover from
what has been branded the worse economic crisis in American History since the Great
Depression. Yet, a relative decline in the U.S.’s economic position does not necessarily
translate into increased power for China. There are other variables that complicate the
equation.
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It is too early to determine with certainty China’s future direction. It is important
to note that in spite of its economic success, China is still undergoing a process of
economic reform; the full conversion to capitalism remains incomplete. This fact presents
China’s leadership with many internal obstacles. Still, the prospect that China will
become the world’s largest economy is daunting for many observers. Such apprehensions
are based on concerns that, as China’s capabilities increase it will seek to restructure the
rules of the current system to its advantage.
These concerns, while valid, are somewhat misguided for two reasons. First, even
if China did manage to surpass the U.S. economically, per capita income within the U.S.
would still be four times that of China. 154 As a result, “China would then be the poorest
“superpower” in world history.” 155 It would not have the same type of consumer power
generated from the U.S.’s domestic markets. Thus, any shock to China’s domestic market
would have severe ramifications for the economic health of the nation. The recent effects
of the credit crisis have illustrated this clearly. Beijing is now taking measures to boost its
domestic economy to insulate itself from another further shocks from the international
markets. 156 A second reason to consider, when processing the implications of China’s
ability to become the world’s largest economy is that this ability is conditional. China
would become the world’s largest economy only if it maintains its current growth rate of
9.5%. In the years to come, this will present China’s leadership with enormous
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challenges. Currently, every $1 of GDP generated requires China to use three times more
energy than the global average and four times more energy than the U.S. 157
When faced with soaring oil prices and the heightened competition for finite
energy resources outlined in the previous chapter, it will become increasingly difficult for
China to maintain the “peaceful” character of its rise while simultaneously attempting to
satisfy its excessive appetite for energy and growth. If China is unable to curb its growing
demand for energy, it may well be drawn into direct conflict with major international
powers. China’s leadership is well aware of the strident necessity to avoid such a scenario
because of the dire repercussions it would have on the Chinese economy. The previous
Chapter demonstrated how a more aggressive China in the international arena would have
the effect of destabilizing important trade and commercial relationships, such as that with
the U.S. Since trade accounts for over half of the Chinese economy, maintaining access
to international markets is just as critical as securing energy supply in order for China to
sustain its growth rate. As a result, even if China were to become the world’s largest
economy, as the demand for energy increases in relation to its relative supply, China’s
leadership would be confronted with fixing an increasingly inefficient system.
In essence, China’s internal challenges are emblematic of those confronting many
of the up and coming “second world” countries, such as Brazil and India. Similar to those
two nations, the benefits of China’s economic success have been distributed unequally
across the mainland. Wealth is largely confined to urban centers, principally in the
coastal regions, while the country’s more rural regions remain backward and almost
feudalistic. Although China’s economic reforms have lifted about four hundred million
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above the poverty level of U.S. $1 a day, it has also increased the disparity of wealth
between the rich and the poor. Statistics indicate that the richest ten percent of China’s
population hold 45 percent of China’s wealth, while the poorest ten percent hold only 1.4
percent. 158 Yet, China faces a burden that is unique among developing nations. It is
joined only by India in this respect. The sheer size of China’s population exacerbates the
challenges to the current regime presented by such a degree of social inequality.
Notably, the numbers of China’s poor are equivalent to the entire populations of the U.S.
and Japan combined. 159
The social instability resulting from this gap in wealth is further enhanced by the
creeping threat of unemployment in the country. China’s leadership has estimated that it
must maintain an annual growth rate of at least seven percent in order to create enough
jobs for its exponentially growing and urbanized workforce. 160 The greatest threat to
China’s future political and social stability, in this respect, is not the millions of
unemployed peasants in the country, but the recent phenomenon of unemployment
amongst college graduates. The high demand by foreign multinationals for cheap Chinese
labor allows the government to create numerous jobs in the “low skill” industries, such as
manufacturing. Jobs that require a greater level of intellectual merit, on the other hand,
have been more difficult to develop. Although the enrollment of Chinese students in
higher education has substantially increased, this trend indicates that better qualifications
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have yet to translate into better opportunities. “The Chinese Ministry of Education
reported that about 25% of the 3.38 million students who graduated in 2005 will be
unable to find jobs.” 161 In addition to this fact, those statistics, citing the hundreds of
thousands of engineering and science students in China fueling its productive advantage
over the U.S., often neglect to mention that only about one tenth of those students can
compete internationally. 162 The historical record shows that this type of displacement and
dissatisfaction amongst a society’s student and intellectual populations is the breeding
ground for political and social unrest and potentially rebellion. This fact is most
recognizable in the case of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and even in China’s own
Communist Revolution in 1949.
Social unrest is only one of the many domestic issues plaguing China. 163 For the
purpose of this analysis, however, it stands out because of the critical role it plays in
limiting China’s international behavior. Social inequality is one of the greatest concerns
for the leadership of any developing nation, especially one like China that is on a
successful path internationally. It is the greatest source contributing to political turmoil
and transition because of the fact that the impoverished groups may become resentful of
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the leadership’s inability to distribute social and economic benefits equally. History has
repeatedly demonstrated that growing unemployment rates, combined with a distorted
distribution of wealth and a lack of social mobility, can single handedly derail progress
and undermine a government’s legitimacy. Most recently, this phenomenon is once again
unfolding in Latin American. The disproportionate numbers of leftist governments that
now represent the region were elected on platforms promising greater social equality and
employment opportunities across demographic lines.
It is clear that the Communist Party has placed a high premium on maintaining its
power. When this fact is combined with the potentially destabilizing threat to the current
regime, of social unrest, U.S. policy makers can accurately predict that alleviating these
grievances will be one of the top priorities for Beijing. Thus far, China’s Communist
Party has been able to resist the transitional forces of democracy that generally
accompany such a pattern of economic liberalization. With the erosion of Communism’s
ideological appeal, the regime no longer commands affective loyalty from the people.
The regime now relies on instrumental loyalty. Therefore, the government’s legitimacy
now rests on its ability to deliver high levels of sustained economic growth and
increasing the country’s international prestige. Recognition as a great power by the
international community is a central demand on the leadership of China’s highly
nationalistic citizens. Failure to deliver the goods is likely to undermine the Party’s
authority.
In fact, there are now early warning signs indicating growing unrest amongst
China’s citizens and dissatisfaction with the leadership is on the rise in spite of the
country’s high levels of economic performance. A survey from the country’s official
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newspaper, The People’s Daily (which is, of course, controlled by the state), noted that
70% of China’s people believed the gap in income was having negative effects on social
stability within the country. The same survey also cited the peoples’ anger over official
corruption and the mass accumulation of wealth it has facilitated amongst Party
members. 164 The Party’s continuous struggle to secure domestic legitimacy in spite of
these growth rates can be explained by what Henry Kissinger maintains is “the
incommensurability between a nation’s domestic and its international experience.” 165
From this viewpoint, he argues that “a nation will evaluate a policy in terms of its
domestic legitimization because it has no other standard of judgment.” 166 By this
standard, if China cannot translate its international success into greater domestic
prosperity as seen through more equally distributed opportunities and benefits, there is a
significant risk that the regime will soon face a breach in its authority over the people.
The urgent threat which rising social unrest presents to the stability of the regime
supports the conclusion that Beijing, at least to some extent, will have to divert some of
its attention from foreign affairs to fixing these domestic problems. The size and
importance of China’s own economy as compared with the global economy, however,
will allow it to remain a formidable force in international relations despite these internal
problems or its inability to achieve “superpower” status. Still, so long as these domestic
issues threaten the Party’s power, they will command the leadership’s attention.
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In this respect, Beijing has already demonstrated that it is willing to employ a
greater level of assertiveness in its foreign policy to secure its internal position, even if it
means risking international castigation for its actions. Its behavior in relations with Sudan
is a case in point. Because of China’s need to secure petroleum to sustain its domestic
growth, it casts a blind eye to Sudan’s human rights violations, even going so far as
supplying Sudan with military weapons. Although recent event suggest Beijing is
changing its position, its rigidity to a position of non-interference in the internal matter of
states, when set against the state of unimaginable violence in Darfur, borderlines criminal
negligence. Moreover, the coercive suppression of political activist Hu Jia, only months
away from the Olympics, is yet another example of the priority which the Party places on
preserving its position in spite of the unfavorable opinions its actions may generate
within the international community. This proves that, even though portraying a positive
image to the international community is a central motivation behind Chinese policy, the
regime’s efforts to defend its own power outweigh the latter. Any effective form of
American diplomacy must factor in these motivations that influence China’s behavior.
On the other hand, one could persuasively argue that these social grievances in
fact, heighten, rather than limit the possibility for conflict with the U.S. on two counts:
(I)

It can be plausibly maintained that China’s necessity to maintain its

current growth rate in order to deter further social unrest will only fuel
greater competition for energy sources with the United States. This suggests
that China’s energy demand will continue to guide its foreign policy for the
purpose of sustaining its economic growth. For this reason, it is in the
national interest of the United States to develop alternative sources of
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energy. Nevertheless, this counterpoint neglects to consider a critical fact,
namely, that, in spite of China’s continued economic success, social unrest
is still on the rise. Most recently, this reality was clearly reflected in the
domestic outrage reverberating through China over the Party’s inadequacy
to alleviate the destabilizing ramifications as a result of the large-scale ice
storms in early February. The fragility of China’s internal position and the
pervasive regional inequality were exposed when millions were left without
power in southern China. 167 This region’s demographic is overwhelmingly
represented the poor migrant workers of China’s coalmines. China’s
increasing dependence on coal,resulting from high demands for energy, is
forcing these workers to submit to long hours and poor, at time even fatal,
working conditions. Feeling exploited and neglected by the government,
these migrant workers are growing increasingly disillusioned and frustrated
with the Communist Party. Therefore, if China’s leadership wishes to
remain in power, it must supplement the country’s economic growth with a
broader program of social reforms. Rectifying the depth of China’s social
inequality and developing a viable program that is compatible with the
country’s vast population will require detailed planning and close attention.
By virtue of this fact, the complexities of such an endeavor will undoubtedly
divert a significant amount of attention from areas of foreign policy.
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Ultimately, an inwardly focused China is less likely to clash with the United
States than an outer directed one. 168
(II) A second counterargument, that China’s internal problems suggests
negative implications for its external relations, stems from an established
tendency amongst states facing pervasive domestic problems to divert the
local population’s attention from these issues by provoking conflict with
an external adversary. Presently, both President Chavez of Venezuela and
President Ahmadinejad of Iran have targeted the United States as the root
cause of all evils facing their respective countries. In reality, however, it is
the domestic problems, precipitated by their management of their
respective governments, that are responsible for the prevailing social
unrest within those nations. Chapter three illustrates how certain U.S.
officials, particularly in Congress, are likewise guilty of invoking this very
practice by painting China as the primary culprit behind our staggering
economy.
Given this trend, it has been argued that, if the Communist Party’s
position begins dramatically to falter, it may appeal to the nation’s fervent
nationalism to sustain its leadership position. Under such a policy
approach, Beijing would invoke the nation’s historic fear of encirclement
by Western Powers, painting an image of the U.S. as an adversary that
desires to suppress the rise of China and retain Taiwan for itself. The Party
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would then portray itself as the only force strong enough to counter these
attempts. This scenario would serve as a breeding ground for an inevitable
security conflict over the island due to the consequent heighted tensions
and mistrust. The strong forces of nationalism in China, coupled with
brooding suspicions in Beijing of American containment, render this
scenario plausible, but not inevitable.
In this case, China would have to launch a preemptive strike
against Taiwan in order to elicit an American response. Such an attack
would have a deleterious effect on China’s international standing. At the
present moment, China appears to be too integrated with, and benefits too
much from, the system to risk such aggressive behavior. Furthermore, in
its pursuit of Taiwan’s integration, China has emphasized economic
cooperation over more coercive tactics to meet its objective of
reunification. The Pentagon, however, in it militaristic fashion, tends to
exaggerate the scope of China’s adoption of coercive methods, while
downplaying any constructive economic ties between Taiwan and the
mainland. If the U.S. were to base its policies solely on reports from the
Pentagon, we would be in a perpetual state of war.
Evaluating China’s rise against its dependence on the international community
will better illustrate the limitations restraining the country’s level of foreign adventurism,
which has inadvertently contributed to an adversarial image of China in the United States.
International Constraints on China’s Behavior
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The previous chapter examines the extent to which China’s economic prosperity
is a direct result of its exposure to, and integration with, the global economy, as well as
its increased participation in its respective institutions. Thus, while the current system is
responsible for transforming China into a geopolitical force, China remains equally
dependent on the system to sustain is newfound prowess. The fact that foreign trade
accounts for seventy percent of China’s overall GDP reflects the scope of this
dependence. The subsequent effect of the U.S. credit crisis on China’s domestic markets
also supports this claim. China’s economic growth, therefore, depends on its ability to
maintain amicable relations with foreign investors and its major trading partners, namely,
the United States and the European Union. In spite of the United States’ declining
economic superiority, China still remains heavily dependent on its access to U.S.
markets. Therefore, the level of China’s assertiveness in its foreign policy is measured
against an obvious reality: any actions, such as an invasion of Taiwan, that would elicit a
political backlash within the U.S. prompting it to close its markets to Chinese imports.
This would have debilitating results for China’s internal position in that it would stagnate
economic growth and cause unemployment rates to soar. These are two scenarios that run
counter to China’s national interests and this thesis has demonstrated extensively that
China is a state that overwhelmingly acts in accordance with its own interests.
The growing level of assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy is indicative of its
desire to assume a bigger role, not only as a regional force, but also a world power. If
these early years of the twenty first century are any indicator, China is on a steady path to
securing this position. The way to the top, however, requires increased participation in
international organizations. China’s integration into a growing number of international
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organizations (outlined in Appendix I), demonstrates a greater incentive to achieve its
goals by cooperating with the system rather than taking coercive measures to impose its
demands. Its participation not only in the WTO, but also various security treaties and
organizations including, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is representative of this
behavior. 169 The possibility of receiving an invitation to join the G-8 also motivates
China’s leadership to act as a responsible partner as contrasted with a petulant state,
motivated solely by its own self interest in the international system. China’s efforts to
persuade the government of Sudan to accept the largest peacekeeping force in Darfur
indicates a growing flexibility with respect to its longstanding position of noninterference in the sovereign affairs of states. This, in turn, represents the influence of
the international community in altering China’s aggressive behavior. This development is
further explored in section two below.
Factors Limiting the Risks for a Security Conflict over Taiwan
In a special report regarding the rise of China, Dominic Ziegler makes reference
to the argument by a prominent Chinese scholar, David Lampton, that nations use three
means to achieve their national goals: (i) coercion; (ii) material inducement; or (iii)
intellectual motivation. Loosely translated, this can be interpreted as guns, money, and
ideas. 170 Ziegler argues, in accordance with Lampton’s view, that the manner in which
169
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rising nations use these three provides tremendous insight for the type of power a nation
is likely to become in the future. Observing China’s behavior in its own region reveals a
greater tendency to emphasize “money and ideas” over “guns” in Beijing’s effort to settle
its territorial disputes and peacefully to resolve the tensions that have generally
characterized this region. With respect to the issue of Taiwan, the evidence provides
further support for the image of China as a responsible and cooperative power, as
contrasted with belligerence.
In spite of the Peoples Liberation Army’s (the “PLA”) expanding military
capabilities, Beijing understands that, in order to foster the continuation of China’s
economic success, the preservation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific is a
fundamental requirement. From this viewpoint, provoking a security conflict with Taiwan
would run counter to China’s interests. In this respect, China has taken a number of
measures that endorse the legitimacy of its claims, which demonstrate that it seeks to
promote the reunification of Taiwan to the mainland by peaceful means. Moreover,
Beijing actively promotes cross-strait investment and trade in order to deepen its
economic ties with Taiwan. In 2002, China surpassed the United States as Taiwan’s
number one export destination. 171
The logic behind deepening these economic ties is similar to the one used by Jean
Monnet when he laid the foundation for the creation of the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1957. The theory was that, as a result of deeper economic
integration, there would be an increased level of shared interests among the EEC’s
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members. In some form or another, these interests would inevitably overlap with political
and security matters. It followed that these mutual economic interests would provide
greater incentive for increased political collaboration in areas where such interests were
not mutually exclusive. The position was that, over time, deeper economic ties would
enmesh the political and security systems of the EEC’s member. While there may still be
some measure of debate whether the E.U. has a common foreign and security policy and
political system, it is undeniable that the system, that gave birth to first the European
Economic Communities, and then the European Union, has played a major role in
contributing to the absence of violent power struggles and bloody wars, that had beset
Europe for more than a century. In hindsight, it is easy to forget the historic antipathy
between Germany and France which threatened to undermine this development. It is very
important, however, to keep this fact in mind when assessing the forces threatening to
obstruct Taiwan’s integration into the mainland.
Even if deeper economic integration does not lead to reunification, it does greatly
deter the possibility of a security conflict. This reality was reflected during Taiwan’s
recent elections in January. The Kuomintang Nationalist Party (which was the principal
opponent of Mao’s Communist Party and the architect of Taiwan’s separation from the
mainland) won almost three-quarters of the seats in Parliament. As of late, it has operated
on a platform that advocates maintaining the status quo between China and Taiwan
without ruling out eventual reunification. Their victory limits the influence of current
President Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party, that has outwardly
provoked China and put the United States in a precarious position with his efforts to
promote a strong national identity for Taiwan. Many analysts have interpreted President
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Chen’s poor electoral performance as a rejection of his hostile approach towards China.
But more importantly, one New York Times Article reports:
Analysts also said some Taiwanese feared that Mr. Chen’s approach was preventing the
island’s businesses from profiting fully from the mainland’s economic boom. Voters
apparently decided that the strategy had garnered few economic benefits for Taiwan and
may have isolated it further politically. 172

Thus, these recent developments in Taiwan suggest that: (i) its citizens are placing a
greater priority on sustaining the country’s economic prosperity by maintaining peace
with China; and (ii) this policy is taking greater preference over nationalist demands for
statehood that would provoke a security conflict. In their assessment of the potential for
conflict over Taiwan, U.S. policy makers, in order to gain greater insight, should pay
closer attention to these new developments in cross-strait relations rather than the
Pentagon’s reports of the PLA’s military development.
Taken together, this economic integration approach by China suggests a pattern of
behavior that qualifies as that of a “rational and responsible” power. Such powers
traditionally act in accordance with their national interest, developing a pattern of
behavior that is predictable and easy to interpret.
At the current moment and for the foreseeable future China benefits tremendously
from the status quo. Therefore, assuming China is a rational and responsible power,
overturning the current system or provoking a strategic rivalry or security conflict with
the United States seems unlikely since it runs counter to China’s national interest. In fact,
Chinese critics of the Bush Administration argue: “that it is not China but the United
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States that is a nation which [seeks to] alter the status quo.” 173 Given the recent trajectory
of U.S. foreign policy these accusations fall on ample grounds.
Still, there remains a looming suspicion on the part of the U.S. that questions the
credibility of China’s commitment to international cooperation despite these constructive
aspects of Chinas behavior regionally and internationally. Is it simply a continuance of
Deng’s instructions for the country to “bide its time, but also get some things done in the
meantime,” some grand scale act of deception? 174 More specifically the question remains
whether China is cooperating only until it is strong enough to overturn the system. I
would argue that these accusations are largely based on paranoia that China is attempting
to replace the U.S.’s dominant role in the Asia-Pacific, as contrasted with a more
substantial motive to support the stability of the system. Nevertheless, there are many
legitimate forces, namely, China’s growing demands for energy sources, that may
undermine China’s commitment to the international system as well as its relationship
with the United States. To resolve these on a mutually satisfactory basis, I submit that it
would be in the best interests of the United States to pacify the growing tensions in its
relationship with China now before they reach a point of no return.
SEC. 2: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
Under the current Bush Administration, a framework was set forth in 2005 by
former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick that works towards the end of making
China a more “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. While there have
been several important instances of diplomatic collaboration, such as the Six Party Talks
with North Korea, the Bush Administration has developed this policy more in the form of
173
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deepening China’s integration into the international markets.The underlying assumption
is that an increased level of economic dependence will provide a greater incentive for
cooperation on an array of diplomatic issues. The CATO Institute, in accordance with the
organization’s staunch faith in the “hard” power of the free market system, supports this
method. In fact, it strongly advocates on behalf of developing closer trade ties with China
for the purpose of achieving a more “cooperative and constructive relationship” with
Beijing. 175
This recommendation and the Bush Administration’s approach towards
engagement with China, however, needs to be revised. Although U.S. policy makers
should resist the allure of protectionism that has recently descended upon Congress
through an effort to erect higher barriers and anti-dumping regulations to impede imports
from China, trade and particularly restrictive trade procedures should not be the departure
point for improving this relationship.
Despite the collaborative efforts between China and the U.S. during the Six Party
Talks to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program, both powers continue to emphasize
economic dialogues over diplomatic and security ones. To reiterate an earlier argument,
while trade increases economic co-dependence between states, it does not have the same
impact on their diplomatic exchanges. In fact, it tends to have somewhat of an adverse
effect. Economic co-dependence, in relationships such as the one between China and the
United States, has stimulated resentment and suspicion as a result of some perceived
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vulnerability of one of the states to actins on the part of the other state.176 Furthermore, if
China does one day emerge as a future adversary, this approach provides no insulation
against such a threat, while continuing to strengthen China’s economic capabilities. 177
Increased economic integration neither prevents nor corrects the misperceptions that
increase the risk of war amongst international powers.
In order to avert this possibility in the future, any form of greater economic
integration must be accompanied by increased communication regarding pressing
diplomatic and security matters. Currently, China and the U.S. hold an array of annually
occurring official U.S.-China bilateral dialogues. These include: The Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade; the U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee; The U.S. China
Joint Commission on Science and Technology; The U.S. China-Economic Development
and Reform Dialogue; and The U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue. In 2005 and 2006
the U.S. Chinese Senior Dialogue and the U.S. Chinese Strategic Economic Dialogue
were added to this list. 178 A common theme amongst these dialogues is an emphasis on
economic and commercial issues. The obvious dialogue missing from this list, and
perhaps the one that is most needed, is one concerning military and defense issues.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the political relationship between China
and the U.S. has taken a backseat to the economic one. When examining U.S.-China
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relations it is almost impossible to separate the issues into such rigid categories.
Nevertheless, it true that, in the last decade, a greater emphasis has been placed upon
matters concerning trade and finance between the two countries within both the U.S.
government apparatus and the mainstream media. When the mutual threat of the Soviet
Union evaporated it had the effect of leaving a tremendous vacuum in this relationship.
For almost twenty years, containing the threat of a Soviet invasion had served as the
primary motivation for collaboration between China and the U.S. In the absence of such a
threat, the tremendous cultural and political divide that existed between the U.S. and
China was readily exposed. Yet, the process of economic liberalization and development
in China offered a discernible solution to this problem. China’s transformation towards
free-market capitalism provided a new incentive for collaboration between Beijing and
Washington regardless to the gaps in political and cultural values.
As China emerges as a global power, the challenges it presents to the U.S. are
tempered with greater opportunities for collaboration, reaching beyond commercial
interests to diplomatic and security matters. Contrary to the belief among prominent
circles of U.S. policy makers, today China’s interests are more compatible with those of
the U.S. than they were during the Cold War era. The reality of this statement is often
overlooked because of an American tendency to exaggerate areas of competition with
those states we perceive to be potential rivals. Yet, from the data provided in the previous
chapter, it is undeniable that neither country is benefiting from: soaring oil prices; the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in an age of global terrorism; or the potential of a
security conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. The next U.S. President should embark upon
a policy of encouraging high-level diplomatic exchanges with China, like those between
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Zhou and Kissinger, that explicitly articulate the areas of mutual interests between the
two nations. Such regularly occurring dialogues should seek to reestablish a level of trust
that has diminished and given way to greater suspicion between our two nations.
Although this may seem trivial, the exchanges between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1972
reflect how central the existence of mutual trust is to the success of such high level
diplomatic exchanges. The Senior Dialogue is a beginning step for this process.
Promoting greater cooperation on these issues will help to balance the competing
interests that threaten to tilt the dynamic of this relationship towards a strategic rivalry. A
policy that places a greater emphasis on multilateralism should be used to address areas
of competing interests, thereby shielding U.S. interests against the future risks of China’s
rise. Keeping more coercive and unilateral “hedging” tactics at a minimum would be best
suited to achieve these ends. Using this general approach as a sounding board, the
following subsections provide specific details of such a policy in relation outstanding
disputes cited in chapter three.
Specific Policy Recommendation for Selected Areas of Competing Interests
Security Challenges: The future of Taiwan and China’s Military Development
Highlights for Security Challenges
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Problem does not lie directly with U.S. or Chinese Policy vis-à-vis Taiwan;
American insecurity rests in increased capabilities of PLA and sizable deployment
along the strait; policies should focus on this
Establish an official bilateral Senior Dialogue that specifically addresses security
and defense issues
Fill post for U.S. Ambassador to ARF to watch China’s security interactions in
region
Petition as a joint venture with the E.U. to become an observer of SCO
In “hedging” tactics place greater emphasis on renewing commitment to the
development of the region through aid rather than strengthening military alliances
Restructure World Bank and IMF to make them more effective in this endeavor
Make this central focus of bilateral relations with Japan and South Korea rather
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•

than military agreements
Realistic assessment of China’s power in the region is necessary, source is “soft”
not “hard” military capabilities

There is little room for flexibility with respect to U.S. policy on the issue of
Taiwan. The United States is committed to the defense of Taiwan because of its security
obligations set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act. 179 China and the U.S. have avoided
escalating tensions over this issue until very recently. This suggests that the problem does
not lie directly with U.S. or Chinese policy vis-à-vis Taiwan, but elsewhere. In the pursuit
of reducing tensions over this issue, the next U.S. administration should isolate the
factors that have contributed to growing strains in relations over this issue. It is submitted
that the increased capabilities of the PLA and the sizeable deployment of its forces along
the strait are a leading cause of American insecurity over the possibility of potential
conflict. Therefore, it would be wise to take measures that rectify these concerns before
making any changes to U.S. Taiwan policy, which has proved to be quite successful up
until these new developments in the Chinese military.
The first step in addressing the anxieties, that are fueling mutual suspicions and
driving mistrust in both China and the U.S relating to security and defense issues, would
be to establish an official bilateral dialogue, similar to the existing ones, that deals
exclusively with military and defense issues. This would allow for a greater level of
transparency that is currently missing. In addition to this bilateral dialogue, the U.S.
should take a more active interest in the multilateral regional organizations of which
China is a member. China has been a member of the region wide security organizations,
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), since 1994. In 2004, for example, Beijing proposed
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that ARF begin to address military issues and was the site for the first exchanges between
defense officials of the organizations members. The newly created post of a U.S.
ambassador for ASEAN affairs allows the United States to play a more proactive role in
the development of China’s security relations in the forum of this multilateral
organization. 180 Moreover, it allows the U.S. a better opportunity for observing China’s
behavior in pursuit of its regional security interests and facilitates effective formulation
by the U.S. of policies to deal with this issue.
The U.S. should also seek to enhance ties with other Asian security institutions,
such as The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which China is joined by
other rising powers like Russia. Traditionally, the organization has been seen as hostile to
U.S. interests by many American leaders because of: (i) the high number of authoritarian
states among its members; and (ii) the lesser stated goal of the organization that was
mainly for the purpose of the Cold War undermine U.S. influence in the region.
However, the collective threat of global terrorism gives the U.S. new opportunities to
collaborate with China in the forum of this organization. Existing policy
recommendations have advocated that the U.S. petition to join the SCO as an observer in
order to coordinate more effective policies with the organization’s members on this
issue. 181 I would add, however, that the U.S. should pursue this initiative as a joint
venture with the E.U. This approach would be more effective because it demonstrates a
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genuine interest in multilateral cooperation. Approaching the organization unilaterally
would undoubtedly fuel suspicions and elicit accusations that the U.S. was trying to
“spy” on the group’s activities to make sure they do not undermine U.S. authority.
It is inevitable that any future U.S. security policy in Asia will incorporate some
form of “hedging” to protect U.S. interests in the event that China should emerge as a
future rival. In pursuit of such tactics, almost every existing policy recommendation
places clear emphasis on strengthening the U.S.’s military alliances in the region. While
some level of strengthening U.S. military action as will be necessary, it should not be the
focus of U.S. policy. There are two reasons for this suggestion. First, making such
abrasive tactics the cornerstone of U.S. policy would be ultimately self-defeating because
they proliferate the risks of facing China as an enemy. Overstating the importance of U.S.
military alliances with such nations such as Japan and South Korea in this approach
would cater directly to China’s historic fear of encirclement. As a result, the Chinese are
likely to interpret such extensive bilateral military alliances in their region as security
threat and respond accordingly. The Chinese could then possibly proceed by expanding
military deployment and development in the region or increase efforts to establish their
own web of military alliances to offset those of the U.S.
In this environment of fleeting alliances, the likelihood that China and the U.S.
would enter into a type of Cold War rivalry vying for spheres of influence is very strong.
In the event such an occurrence, the historically volatile nature of the Asia-Pacific
coupled with the increased levels of mistrust and insecurity among states heightens the
risks for the type of security conflict with China that the United States was trying to avoid
in the first place.
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A second reason offered in objection to excessive hedging measures of this nature
is that, once again, U.S. policy makers are misinterpreting the source of China’s power.
The growing influence China is experiencing in this region that is threatening the U.S.’s
traditional role as the dominant power is not the result of China’s expanding military
capabilities. Thus, strengthening bilateral military alliances in the region only protects the
U.S. against China’s “hard power”, which, for the time being and the foreseeable future,
is significantly inferior to that of the U.S. On the other hand, this strategy does nothing to
protect the U.S. from the consequences of China’s mounting “soft power”, which is the
primary force behind its expanding role as a regional leader.
China’s massive reserves allow the country to boost its influence in the region by
giving out supplemental aid packages to its poor neighbors, much the way the U.S. did
after World War II. Cambodia and Sri Lanka are both examples of countries that have
benefited from Chinese capital aid packages. In April 2006, China’s Prime Minister, Wen
Jiabao, announced that China would dispense $600 million to the Cambodian government
for the development of the country’s infrastructure. China’s aid package was almost
equivalent to the entire international aid budget put up by such institutions as the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, with an array of other bilateral donors. 182 Most
recently, China has quietly moved into India’s backyard to provide the Sri Lankan
government with similar aid packages. According to one New York Times report,
“Chinese assistance has grown fivefold in the last year to nearly $1 billion, eclipsing Sri
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Lanka’s longtime biggest donor, Japan. The Chinese are building a highway, developing
two power plants and putting up new ports…”. 183
These actions are contributing tremendously to China’s increased credibility in
the region. Traditional donors Western donors, such as the United States and the E.U., are
now being replaced by the newly rich and rising Eastern Powers, such as China.
Countries such as Cambodia and Sri Lanka appreciate Chinese funds because “when
China gives, it doest say do this or do that. [The recipient states] can do whatever [they]
want with the money.” 184 The aid packages that such countries receive from international
institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank along with individual Western powers,
usually come with various demands and conditions that limit the recipients’ ability to use
these funds freely.
If the U.S. wants to keep a strong foothold in the region and bolster its faltering
influence against China’s growing diplomatic power, it must focus on deepening regional
ties through increased aid programs. Moreover, renewing the U.S.’s commitment to
developing the region, a program that it initiated after the Korean War, is a much less
aggressive and outwardly confrontational tactic than exclusively pursuing a strategy that
deepens bilateral military ties.
Problematically, however, the U.S. does not have the same amount of reserves
that it did after World War II, which allowed it to initiate such effective economic aid
programs as the Marshall Plan. Arguably, it was these programs, more so than our
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military bases in Europe and Asia, that legitimized our authority as a regional hegemony.
Therefore, despite the limitations of the U.S.’s faltering economy on its diplomatic reach,
it is submitted that the U.S. it must pursue venues allowing it to maintain a post of “soft
power” in the region. The best course of action would be one that works closely with
India and Japan to increase aid packages in the region. Any future “hedging” strategy
should incorporate this “soft power” aid program. Deepening our military alliances with
Japan and India should be secondary to this primary “soft power” approach. Japan still
has a formidable amount of capital liquidity at its disposal as a result of its towering
reserves.
Yet any such efforts must be paralleled with increased packages of international
and multilateral aid from institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. This will
require the U.S. to work very closely with the E.U. towards restructuring the governance
of institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, which have increasingly been criticized
for inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Part of these reforms must include a release by the
U.S. and the major E.U. ember States, of their oligarchic control of such institutions and
providing China and other developing nations with a bigger stake in the leadership of
these organizations. 185 Excessively operating outside the scope of these institutions could
lead to a scenario where smaller countries could play China off the U.S., Japan, and India
in order to gain greater bargaining leverage. These smaller countries would then aim to
manipulate the perceived competition to influence the strategic influence of the larger
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powers in a way that best advances their own. Ultimately, the U.S. needs to focus its
energies on restoring the legitimacy of its “soft power”. It is submitted that making this
the principal goal of U.S. policy in East Asia will prove to be more beneficial for
enlisting China’s cooperation in other areas, such as nuclear proliferation. Reducing the
centrality of regional military alliances will help weaken Chinese accusations that the
U.S. is implementing a policy of confrontational containment that is hostile to China’s
rise.
Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iran
Highlights of Strategy for Iran
•
•

Strengthen existing non-proliferation treaties and organizations
U.S. has to follow the rules itself, can’t go around making agreements with India
and then expect China to cooperate with Iran

China’s strategic energy interests in Iran will make it very difficult to enlist
China’s collaboration in dismantling Iran’s nuclear facilities in the same way the U.S. did
with North Korea. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible. Those existing
policy recommendations advocating that the U.S. should convince China of the need for
its cooperation on this issue because “it is a vital component of our mutual confidence
and our bilateral relationship”, do not address the present realities of this relationship. 186
Even as a rhetorical tactic this suggestion would fail to yield any results. It depicts the
type of unbalanced representation of power in the relationship that inspires such antipathy
from China’s leaders. Hypothetically speaking, were the circumstances reversed, and the
country in question was Saudi Arabia and China was appealing to the U.S. in the absence
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of any concrete evidence to implement an aggressive series of sanctions to influence the
Saudi government, it would be highly unlikely that the U.S. would react with the same
type of responsive it is now expecting from China. Thus, any strategy on this matter must
take into account China’s own interests and appeal to its leadership accordingly.
The best strategy for securing China’s support would be one persuading Beijing
that an Iran with nuclear capabilities at its disposal is not only a threat to U.S. national
security interests, but to its own as well. The next President should draw on the lessons
set forth by Kissinger in his negotiations with Zhou. This strategy would involve a
similar pattern of tapping into the primary motivations shaping China’s national interests
and portraying a nuclear Iran as a clear threat to the advancement of those interests. In
collaboration with their E.U. counterparts, U.S. diplomats should vividly illustrate the
clear threat a nuclear powered Iran would pose to the stability of the entire region in light
of the recent turmoil in Pakistan, which is threatening to revitalize its role as the most
dangerous place in the world. A strong argument can be made that Iran’s nuclear
capabilities would inspire proliferation across the region. Although this outcome is not
guaranteed, what is certain is that the anxieties surrounding this possibility will be
enough to disturb flow of investments to the region and send oil prices through the roof.
Such dramatic increases to the price of oil would have a debilitating impact on China’s
growth rate in spite of any energy benefits it strategic ties to Iran yield.
However, the recently declassified U.S. intelligence report citing inconsistencies
in the CIA’s representation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities greatly limits the effectiveness
of this strategy. Presenting Zhou with clear intelligence of Soviet expansionism along the
Chinese border was key to he success of Kissinger’s strategy. Given this reality, it is my
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recommendation that should then U.S. move to strengthen the existing non-proliferation
organization and treaties to deter future efforts from Iran to acquire a weapon. This
means that the U.S. must also abide by these regulations. When the U.S. makes an ex
parte decision to operate outside the rules set forth by the non-proliferation institutions it
has the effect of undermining their authority and gives other powers an excuse to do the
same. The United States’ effort to establish bilateral nuclear deals with India, which is
not a legitimately sanctioned nuclear power, is a case in point. What is preventing China
from making a similar deal with Iran? If the United States continues to fragment the
international order into a series of bilateral alliances operating outside of the standard
international institutions it runs the risk of inspiring China to do the same. A greater
consequence of these actions would be recreating the mistrust and inclination towards
misinterpretation that dominated the bi-polar world order of the Cold War.
The Debate over Intervention in Sudan:
Highlights for Collaboration on Sudan
•
•

Sudan wants Western aid, China wants to stop being castigated for its dealings
with the Sudanese government, U.S. wants to stop violence in Darfur; there is a
major incentive for collaboration on this issue
China can work behind scenes with Sudanese government while U.S. works
together with U.N. Security council to draft a cease fire agreement that is linked
to increased aid from the West if certain conditions are met

There are new developments indicating that Chinese behavior is yielding to the
demands of the international community on this issue. A recent New York Times Article
cited noticeable changes in China’s strict position of non-intervention towards Sudan
regarding the on-going genocide in Darfur. It has urged the government of Sudan to
accept the largest peacekeeping force in addition to sending engineers to help
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peacekeepers in Darfur. 187 Although China is unlikely to cut of is business ties to the
Sudanese government, this change in attitude is telling of a greater willingness to
cooperate with the international community by becoming a more “responsible” power. It
provides a brighter prospect for the framework of U.S. Chinese relations by supporting
and image of China as a partner instead of an adversary.
The article cites that the Sudanese government places high political capital on
reaching some sort of agreement that would open business and diplomatic contacts with
the United States. Sudan wishes to expose itself to Western aid by engaging with the U.S.
This is a major departure point for increased collaboration between the U.S. and China.
Working together within the apparatus of the U.N. Security Council, China and the U.S.
could work together to negotiate a cease-fire agreement linking the termination of the war
in Darfur to increased exposure to the West. China could use its influence over the
government to accept the terms of such an agreement. Subsequently, this approach
would be in China’s best interest. The international backlash that has come as a result of
Beijing’s ties to Sudan is having negative effects on its reputation. With the Olympics
rapidly approaching it is offsetting the leadership’s efforts promote a responsible
character to the international community.
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Energy Security: Deterring a Resource War
Highlights for Collaboration on Energy Security
•
•
•
•
•

U.S. must lead by example on this issue, next President should focus heavy on a
clean energy policy to help restore U.S.’s leadership role in the world
U.S. needs to work independently and with China to invest and promote research
for “clean” coal burning technology and solar power energy, U.S. needs to get out
of the Middle East
Seek to promote China’s integration into International Energy Agency, will
impose more standards that will help to limit China’s growing appetite and
consumption
U.S. needs to exercise active diplomacy to persuade China that reducing oildependence is in both their long term interests and a BIG incentive for
collaboration
To reassure suspicions of containment U.S. needs to make it clear to China that it
doesn’t want to contain China’s access to oil supply lines

The disputes surrounding the cases of Iran and Sudan would be less likely to
occur in the advent of more effective energy policies. Soaring demands for energy
supplies support the claim that the only way the U.S. will be able to avoid a strategic
rivalry with China in the future is through the development of such policies. Additionally,
the current level of energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions is having
debilitating effects on the environment. On this point, once again the U.S. must lead by
example. If the U.S. chooses to restore its faltering global authority, leadership on energy
policy will prove to be the most promising venue. The U.S. should work independently as
well as with China to invest and promote research that would develop “clean” coal
burning technology and solar power to liberate itself from its dependence on the volatile
oil producing regimes in the Middle East. 188 To enlist greater cooperation from China the
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When considering the recommended sources of alternative energy, hydrogen power is
the most promising because its source is abundant and free. In the competition between
China and the U.S. to secure a productive edge in areas of high skill manufacturing the
strategic advantage will, to a large extent, be determined by which country continues to
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U.S. should supplement its annually occurring bilateral Energy Security Dialogues with a
greater effort to integrate China into the multilateral dialogues among oil-consuming
nations, which would include eventual membership into the International Energy Agency
(IEA). 189 The U.S. must exercise a persistent effort to persuade China that reducing its
dependence on oil is in its long-term interest, while taking steps to reduce its own
dependence. In the absence of an alternative energy policy, China and the U.S. must be
careful not to impede upon what each considers critical supply lines of each other’s
energy. The U.S. must clearly articulate to China that so long as peace ensues between
the two nations, the United States will not attempt to contain China’s access to oil
markets. 190 In turn, this will help clarify U.S. policy to China’s leadership and reassure it
against suspicions of containment in this arena. However, as the demand for energy
increases against a declining supply this will become increasingly difficult, therefore it is
better to rigorously pursue a renewable alternative.

develop high-technology in the area of renewable energy. The most useful example of
this is hydrogen cell technology for cars. Furthermore, in order to limit China’s
competitive advantage in this area of industrial production, the U.S. should be a leader in
pushing for common standards regulating the environmental effects of such technologies
in the next round of amendments to the Kyoto Treaty.
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Human Rights
Highlights on Human Rights
•
•
•
•

Problematic to articulate clear policy on this issue, not considered an area of
“high” national interest, and when there are other more contentious points in the
relationship U.S. needs to be careful not to provoke conflict it
But U.S. should continue to push for a freer society but from a distance
When voicing opposition don’t be self-righteous or use excessive public
condemnations to express outrage
In this circumstances do it in collaboration with the E.U. and organizations such
as Freedom House

Addressing the disputes over human rights is difficult because of the high level of
Chinese sensitivities surrounding the issue. The U.S. must be careful not to directly
interfere in what China considers an internal affair. Therefore, any specific
recommendations for this policy area are difficult to establish because situations of
human rights abuses are generally assessed on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, it
should remain a primary objective of U.S. policy to encourage China to accept greater
respect for human rights in accordance with international norms. A freer Chinese society
is more likely to sustain a commitment to the current international system.
That being said our efforts to inspire greater human rights reform should be less
self-righteous and moralistic and more pragmatic. In situations of human rights abuses
that do merit public condemnation the U.S. should seek to voice these concerns in
collaboration with other Western powers, such as the E.U., and international
organizations such as Freedom House. Presenting such opposition in the forum of a broad
coalition reduces the possibility of creating a U.S. versus China dynamic. It eliminates
the Chinese resentments that accompany traditional unilateral approach of American
interference. The less inclined Chinese citizens are to resent foreign power the more
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likely they are to notice the grievances of their own domestic conditions and push for
reform. Ultimately, the United States needs to lead by example on this issue. 191 It cannot
expect China to adhere to standards of international law that U.S. officials choose to
disregard themselves. Closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay would be one
first important step in this right direction. When the U.S. chooses to vocalize its
opposition to Beijing’s violation of human rights standards, it should be done in unison
with an affirmative coalition behind it. The next administration should only resort to
unilateral sanctions or public shaming in the most extreme circumstances.
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CHAPTER 5:

Conclusion: Updating U.S. Foreign
Policy to the Twenty-First Century

China’s emergence as an economic and geopolitical force in the global
community is lined with both opportunities and challenges for the United States. The
ability to recognize and readily distinguish the two requires that U.S. foreign policy be
based on more realistic and balanced assessments of China’s capabilities and objectives.
Contrary to public opinion, an increase in China’s capabilities and global prestige is not
the cause of what many have observed as a period of decline in U.S. global power. Much
of this damage is self-inflicted rather then some premeditated plot on the part of Beijing
to challenge the U.S. for its hegemonic power. Continuing to interpret China’s rise in
such fatalistic and emotional terms will limit our abilities to understand and prepare for
the real challenges it presents to the future of this country. Such exaggerated fears and
flawed perceptions of China’s power “trigger our Cold War reflexes.” 192 Too much
emphasis is placed on China’s “hard” capabilities, particularly its expanding military
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program and its massive export markets, as the source of its growing influence in
geopolitics. Thus, in the U.S.’s efforts to “hedge” against the risks of a potentially
adversarial China, its methods are still rooted in the Cold War relics of the twentieth
century. These tactics are outdated and will prove ineffective in dealing with those
challenges arising from the present conditions of the international system.
The geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century is already showing signs
that it will be much different than the previous one. China is not the Soviet Union and the
United States no longer generates the affective loyalty it once did as the defender and
champion of liberal democracy. Globalization has created a complex web of
interdependent economic and geopolitical relationships that render the fragmented order
of the Cold War almost counterintuitive. Competition for power and influence in the
global community continues, but the dominion of war has changed. The weapon of
choice is no longer massive militaries and surplus reserves of missiles. These have been
supplanted by large sums of liquidated capital and skills in areas of high technology.
Both of these valuable assets are at China’s disposal.
Additionally, globalization is demanding a higher level of multilateralism in the
diplomatic exchanges among states. In his essay, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, Parag
Khana argues that globalization is making emerging market countries of the developing
“second world” a new force in global politics because of their access to the stated
capabilities of growing importance in this young century. 193 Additionally, many of these
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countries are becoming “hubs for all oil, timber, manufacturing and services, and airlines
and infrastructure, making them an attractive partner for the existing “great powers” of
the U.S. and the E. U.” 194 As a result, these newly rising countries are presenting
themselves as an important consumer market for the world. China is at the forefront of
these countries. But the volume of its economy, the unprecedented capital of its surplus
foreign currency reserves, and its expanding military capabilities allow it to compete with
the E.U. and the U.S., in spite of its developing status. As a result of their newfound
power, these rising countries are demanding more balanced and reciprocal relationships
with the existing “great powers”. The Bush Administration has effortlessly failed to
capture these trends. It outwardly rejects more constructive approaches of mutual
accommodation, stubbornly insisting that such tactics would “embolden the enemy”.
Instead, the Bush Doctrine of preemption and unilateralism seeks to advance U.S.
interests by coercively imposing our system of values on the world. In reality, however,
this style of foreign policy has made the world more hostile to the advancement of such
interests by alienating the U.S. from its allies and further antagonizing its adversaries.
Khana notes:
The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world
inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be
accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America
quickly becoming an ever-lonelier superpower. 195

Arab Emirates, namely Dubai and Abu Dhabi. This is not only because of the growing
capital and influence from the investments of their Sovereign Wealth Funds abroad. In
my own experience, after visiting Dubai and confronted with the rapid pace of innovation
in high technology as seen in the form of groundbreaking architecture and infrastructure,
leads me to believe that such models are the way of the future. My visit to Hong Kong in
December further confirmed these suspicions that modernity is on and Eastward path.
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Contrary to a majority opinion, these new trends among rising states are not the result of
China’s rise. Instead, they are a product of the liberal capitalist system, institutionalized
by the United States after World War II. China’s advantage over the U.S. stems, not only
from its surplus cash, but also its ability to operate within the scope of this new
landscape, while the United States has yet to upgrade its policies to the realities of this
century.
This advantage is most clearly reflected in the race to secure natural resources,
what has been branded the “strategic competition of this century”. It is my conviction,
that the Bush Administration is prolonging our involvement in an unnecessary and
imperialistic war in Iraq to secure a lasting base in the Middle East for the purpose of
safeguarding our oil interests and bolstering our regional influence in the face of an
increasingly hostile Iran. As the Republican candidate for the presidency, Sen. John
McCain’s pledges to advance this goal, serves only to confirm my suspicions. The war in
Iraq, however, has delivered neither a more stable source of oil nor greater democratic
freedoms for the Iraqi people as promised. Instead, it has tarnished America’s reputation
and left our economy vulnerable as a result of reckless spending on the current account
deficit, at a time when the U.S. should be saving and investing. Although China’s
currency may be undervalued, this type of spending has contributed significantly to the
current trade surplus it holds with the U.S.
China’s approach is proving to be more successful. It has been able to secure its
supply lines by saving and investing in countries rich in natural resources, instead of
launching preemptive strikes. 196 Beijing builds up its diplomatic capital with these
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nations by providing funds for the development of infrastructure, and in certain cases
selling weapons to the government. While its involvement with and arms sales to certain
clients may be morally questionable, its methods are not. In its own region, as illustrated
in chapter four, China’s influence is steadily gaining on that of the United States. At a
time when the U.S. is closing its doors to foreigners and erecting fences to keep out
immigrants, China is keeping them open and investing in the development of poorer
countries, and making multilateralism the cornerstone of its diplomacy.
To understand the success of this strategy, and its growing popularity over
exercises of military prowess to secure global and regional influence, one need only to
look at the E.U.’s implementation of this method along its boarders. In 2004, the E.U.
adopted the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to provide greater financial and
technical assistance to its neighbors. Under this policy, the exact terms of this assistance
vary for each country and are set forth in a jointly negotiated Action Plan by the E.U. and
the recipient country. The level of the ENP’s success as a means to advance the policy’s
stated objective, “to establish a mutual commitment to the values of democracy between
the E.U.and its participating neighbors,” is debatable. 197 Still, it is significant to mention
nonetheless, because of the broader implications this approach holds. When taken
together, policies such as the ENP and China’s “smile diplomacy”, suggest a shift in the
nature of power relations among the major states in the international system. In the socalled competition for primacy and influence among the great powers, the traditional
ranking of those capabilities, namely economic and military, relative to a given state’s
power are being restructured. Approaches that emphasize “money and ideas” are being
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used to increase a state’s international power, while the more coercive elements of “guns”
are secondary. 198 To further illustrate this point one should consider the billions of dollars
Abu Dhabi and Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds invested in Citigroup and Merrill
Lynch. After suffering unprecedented losses from the recent credit crunch, the capital
investments from such funds helped to keep the U.S. investment banking system from
going under.
If the U.S. wishes to compete and engage with China in the twenty-first century, it
must play close attention to these developing trends. Our military capabilities will
continue to give the U.S. a formidable advantage over China. But if that is not how the
competition for power and influence is being fought, then what good is it? Building up
our “hard capabilities” should be second to restoring our “soft power” in the world. In
this regard, China’s surplus reserve give it a sizeable advantage over the U.S. Yet, the
United States is still a strong force in global politics and will be for a long time to come.
Its markets are the gateway to Western investments and trade. In addition, its institutions
of higher education and research facilities are still the best in the world. This makes it
attractive to many of the “second world” countries that are critical outlets for U.S.
investment and production.
In an effort to restore the U.S.’s leadership role, or at least reverse the damage of
the last eight years, the next President should follow the lessons set forth by Nixon and
Kissinger in their approach to China. When Nixon took office, the U.S.’s ability to
compete was limited by its involvement in Vietnam and a weakened economic position
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as a result of excessive military spending. Recognizing these limitations on America’s
material capabilities, they sought to bolster the U.S.’s power and influence through
renewed alliances, that although unbalanced, relied on more constructive elements of
engagement.
The necessity for collaboration requires that our exchanges with other nations,
including China, be based on the “art of relating states to each other by agreement rather
than by the exercise of force, by the representation of a ground of action” reconciling
“particular aspirations with a general consensus. Because diplomacy depends on
persuasion and not the imposition of force.” 199 In each of the approaches outlined in
China and the E.U.’s policies,during the course of diplomatic exchanges with their
neighbors, there is a greater preference for multilateralism over the unilateral imposition
of demands. The next U.S Administration should capitalize on this trend. In its conduct
of foreign policy, there should be a greater premium placed on multilateralism.
Accordingly, the there should be an initiative to restructure the existing international
institutions and government organizations to allow for countries like China, Brazil and
India to have a bigger leadership role in these forums and the outcome of its decisions,
and by virtue of this fact, increase their stake in the continuity and stability of the system.
This will require both sacrifice, reflected in a willingness to surrender the U.S.’s
traditional role as the world’s sole leader and patience, to allow for methods of mutual
accommodation to deliver results. Unfortunately, sacrifice and patience are both virtues
that are foreign to the United States. Nevertheless, stubborn adherence to failed policies
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of unilateralism will only continue to marginalize the role and influence of the U.S. in
international relations.
This approach is best served in the U.S.’s relationship with China. The growing
hazards of a degraded environment, the challenges of global terrorism, and the three digit
prices for oil, all provide tremendous opportunities and incentive for increased
collaboration, despite the challenges a rising China may present. However, the basic
realities of its political system, coupled with significant disparities in cultural norms,
account for fundamental incompatibilities in the domestic experiences of China and the
United States. As a result, there exists more room for the type of misperceptions and
mutual suspicions that breed conflicts in the international system. To bridge this gap in
experience and allow for increased cooperation, the “hard” power of the markets as a
form of integration, will have to be supplemented with a greater level of diplomatic
exchanges falling outside the scope trade and commerce issues.
The U.S. should adjust its policy of engagement to factor in the reality that China
is no longer a substantially weaker power. Thus, engaging will need to be based on
advancing mutual interests rather than exercising force through sanctions to bend China’s
interest to meet those of the U.S. In areas where these diverge, China has repeatedly
demonstrated that it is more responsive to addressing competing interests in a multilateral
forum. In order to make progress on the outstanding disputes highlighted in this thesis,
U.S. policymakers will have to recognize this aspect of Chinese behavior to allow for
more successful diplomacy with Beijing.
As the existing great power, the U.S. will play a significant role in shaping the future
of this century. If America chooses to adopt a more constructive approach towards China
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that silences the inflated fears circling the rising titan’s future trajectory, the risks of
facing China as a rival will be significantly reduced. This will result in greater
opportunities for partnership. Yet, if the U.S. continues to “hedge” against this risk
unilaterally and in ways that cater to China’s historic fear of encirclement,allowing for
the powerful forces of Chinese nationalism to “nurture its fantasies [and] cherish its
hates”, the prospects for peace and stability in this century will be limited. 200 At this
critical juncture in U.S.-China relations, the truth Nixon spoke more than thirty-five years
agois relevant now more than ever:

United States Policy is not likely…to have much impact on China’s behavior…But it is
certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world,
that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking…We
will seek to promote understandings which can establish a new pattern of mutually
beneficial actions. 201

Ultimately, there will need to be a greater willingness to collaborate with our allies and a
return to pragmatism and flexibility in U.S. foreign policy, that will secure not only a
positive future course for U.S.-China relations, but also America’s ability to successfully
adapt to the new realities of the international system and its changing role in the world.
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China’s Membership in Multilateral Treaties and Organizations
INTERNATIONAL
Economic

Security

World Trade Organization (WTO)

United Nations Security Council

World Bank

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

International Monetary Fund (IMF)
**not a member but contributes
regularly to aid packages

Chemical Weapons Convention
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Missile Technology Control Regime

REGIONAL

Economic

Security

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC)

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

ASEAN Plus Three

Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO)

APPENDIX II:
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
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Relevant Sections

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act".
FINDINGS AND
DECLARATION OF POLICY
SEC. 2. (a) The President- having terminated
governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on
Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1,
1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary-(1) to help
maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and (2) to promote
the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial,
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people
on Taiwan. (b) It is the policy of the United States-- (1) to preserve and promote
extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the
people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the
China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare
that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic
interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;
(3) to
make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will
be determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the
future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes,
a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern
to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;
and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan. (c) Nothing contained in this Act shall
contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect
to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan.
The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan
are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States. IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN
SEC. 3. (a) In furtherance of
the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
(b)
The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such
defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of
Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of
Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in
connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.
(c) The
President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or
the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the
interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress
shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by
the United States in response to any such danger.
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